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Abstract
In this article, the author argues that antitrust law has entered a new phase of its controversial 
existence. The role of antitrust in moderating inter-firm relationships depends both on the 
problems of the underlying market regime and the institutional capacity of antitrust decision-
makers to respond to those challenges. For much of the 20th century, the model firm was 
hierarchical: vertical integration within the business organization was a way of achieving 
transaction cost efficiencies and delivering higher levels of output at lower prices. Recognition of 
this fact transformed antitrust from its traditional focus on concentrated power, to a policy 
focused on economic efficiency.  This new emphasis necessarily led to a more modest antitrust 
policy, since courts were not institutionally well-suited to promoting efficiency.  However, in the 
past two decades the model firm itself has also been transformed both by changes in technology 
and due to greater volatility of market conditions. Production is increasingly decentralized, and 
characterized by a profusion of deeply collaborative relationships, with innovation as a key 
aspect of firm success. This article brings together the emerging literature that describes the 
changes in firm organization, the governance problems of the new forms of joint development 
and the antitrust responses to those changes. The author argues that antitrust can play an 
important role in governing collaborative production relationships and identifies the institutional 
and remedial mechanisms of the new antitrust policy.
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I. Introduction
Much maligned and more modest than in its recent heyday, antitrust law is yet 
again said to be in search for an equilibrium,1 to adjust the goals and instruments of 
antitrust intervention to changes in the market environment. The paradox of this field of 
law is evident — antitrust tries to save the market mechanism from itself — which means 
that it has no strong friends either among free-marketeers or interventionists.  If we asked 
hypothetically: “What would happen if the antitrust laws were no longer enforced?”, the 
response of our collocutor is likely to be rather muted.2  With other areas of regulation 
(such as environmental or labor law) the policy trade-offs are, at least conceptually, much 
clearer and more apparent.3  Not so with antitrust.  In a world of increasingly open 
markets marked by intense global competition, and a legal universe of targeted legislative 
interventions that correct for specific market failures, it is legitimate to ask whether there 
remains even a residual role for antitrust law.  From such a skeptical point of view, 
antitrust is nothing more than an obstacle to hard-nosed competition or beneficial firm 
collaboration and integration, or an anachronistic legal-regulatory nuisance. With a more 
sinister twist, antitrust can be seen as an extraordinary tool that can be abused by less 
efficient or opportunistic competitors and plaintiff-bar attorneys to disrupt successful 
firms and claim a share of their revenues.  
In the early stages of an always controversial existence, antitrust law was 
assimilated to the field of business crime and misfeasance. Given the progressivist 
concerns at the time of the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, about the 
accumulation of economic and political power in the trusts, as well as the practices for 
buttressing such power that included bid-rigging and cartelization, the standard tools of 
antitrust intervention were based on law enforcement.4  In deciding antitrust cases, 
1 Cf. Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75 
CAL. L. REV. 959, 959 (1987) ("My theme is the narrower one of, to borrow a phrase, the law in search of 
itself."); Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 
(1981) (hereinafter "Fox, Modernization").
2 The academic literature has attempted to engage in more precise speculation on this question. 
Compare, Robert W. Crandall and Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare?  
Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 23-24 (2003) (arguing that the evidence of the net 
benefits of antitrust enforcement is weak and that this justifies only minimal interventions in the most 
egregious cases),  with Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
27, 42 (2003) (arguing that the benefits of antitrust intervention far outweigh the costs of enforcement 
while emphasizing the point that the quantitative calculus is speculative).
3 See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down and Sideways, 75 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1781, 1790-91 (2000).
4 Antitrust law was put in place in the U.S. long before the tools of the modern regulatory state 
emerged during the New Deal.
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generalist courts aimed to elaborate clear rules that would isolate species of prohibited 
business conduct and thereby provide a guide for business compliance.  Such rules, when 
combined with government enforcement and the availability of treble damages in private 
suits, would also have a powerful deterrent effect for firms not to engage in 
anticompetitive conduct.  Despite changes in the focus of antitrust policy and substantial 
evolution in antitrust doctrine in over a century,5 the basic institutional and remedial 
forms for implementing antitrust through the courts have remained unchanged.    
Over time, a number of intractable problems emerged with the standard 
enforcement approach.  First, efficient deterrence requires the elaboration of rules that 
isolate anti-competitive from innocent conduct.  Yet such delineation has proved 
impossible, in part due to recognition that the competitive significance of most business 
conduct subjected to antitrust scrutiny is ex ante ambiguous, irrespective of how the goals 
of antitrust policy are defined.6  As a result, antitrust doctrinal rules have been either 
under-inclusive, or over-inclusive, or worse, conclusory labels that approve or condemn 
particular conduct, but lack substantive content which might guide future compliance.7
Second, given limits in their capacity to analyze conduct on a case-by- case basis and to 
formulate effective remedies to correct for violations, courts have increasingly tended to 
shrink the field of antitrust intervention.  Finally, because of the difficulties associated 
with formulation and supervision of effective non-damage remedies, courts prefer to rely 
on damages awards in antitrust cases.8 Yet treble damage awards often do not fully 
correct the identified problem. An additional concern is that, in the context of a murky 
doctrine, damages may encourage opportunistic misuse of antitrust litigation against 
successful firms.  Therefore, it is no surprise that assimilation to the field of business 
crime has resulted in a restrained antitrust law that most actively polices only conduct 
that closely resembles criminal offenses — namely, clandestine price-fixing conspiracies.
A few stylized facts set the background for this article.  First, since it achieved 
dominance in the academy and the courts over two decades ago, the Chicago School 
dramatically reshaped antitrust law, shifting its concern away from fairness and the 
5 State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (O'Connor, J.) (antitrust law has "recogniz[ed] and adapt[ed] 
to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience").
6 Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive 
Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371 (2002) (commenting on the elusive notion of anticompetitive effects of 
conduct under the antitrust laws).
7 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV 253 (2003).
8 American antitrust lawyers do not view themselves as regulators.  The ideal antitrust remedy is a 
one-off intervention that releases the forces of competition as the main discipline on firms, and thereby 
helps to avoid the heavy hand of regulation. See Robert H. Lande, Professor Waller's Un-American 
Approach to Antitrust, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 137, 142-144 (2000);  Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing 
Globalism Home: Lessons from Antitrust and Beyond, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 113 (2000).
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politics of concentrated economic power, to an overarching concern with economic 
efficiency. Given that firm size and integration are not necessarily inimical to efficiency, 
and that courts are not institutionally well suited to promote efficiency, the new paradigm 
advocated, and produced, a minimalist antitrust policy.9 In such a context, for a scholarly 
effort to propose a more ambitious antitrust policy, it must either provide a better set of 
efficiency-based doctrinal rules, or suggest ways to relax the institutional and remedial 
constraints on decision-making, or some combination of the two.10
Second, in that same period, a fundamental transformation has taken place in the 
model firm itself: from a top-down vertically integrated organization towards looser 
networks of collaboration.11 Rather than emphasizing integration as a way of achieving 
efficiencies within the firm, the new organization relies on inter-firm collaboration, as a 
way of managing uncertainty and developing innovative products in an unstable market 
environment.  Antitrust law has only begun to respond to these changes in the very nature 
of markets.  This article describes these developments and proposes a framework for 
assessing the doctrinal and institutional reactions to the new economy.  The key claim is 
that, antitrust can play an important role in overcoming governance problems of inter-
firm collaboration that create bottlenecks in innovation. However, such a role requires an 
institutional shift away from the traditional deterrence model, a shift which is already 
under way.
To make this claim, the article demonstrates the institutional strains on 
enforcement that emerge during the efficiency stage in antitrust, inspired by the Chicago 
School and the old model of the firm.  Once the rule-based approach was abandoned, 
rather than incorporating fact-specific evidence or economic knowledge in antitrust 
decision-making, the courts responded through doctrinal and procedural short-cuts to 
effectively avoid becoming embroiled in antitrust disputes. The institutional strains were 
exacerbated as novel technologies and different kinds of strategic interaction in more 
dynamic contexts made the efficiency calculus more complex.12 In the new production 
9 On the Chicago view, there is no logical reason if a court does not understand a particular practice, 
to outlaw it. Ronald H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in 3 POLICY ISSUES AND 
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 59, 67 (V. Fuchs ed. 1972); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1984).
10 See, e.g., William E. K ovacic, Achieving better practices in the design of competition policy 
institutions, 50 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 511 (2005); William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: 
Using Ex Post Assessments of Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 843 (2001).
11 See, generally, John Roberts, THE MODERN FIRM, (2004) (hereinafter "Roberts, Modern Firm"); 
Charles F. Sabel, Real Time Revolution in Routines, in THE CORPORATION AS A COLLABORATIVE 
COMMUNITY, 106 (C. Hecksher & P. Adler eds., 2005) (hereinafter "Sabel, Real Time Revolution").
12 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 939 (2001) .
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environment, innovation is key to success, and on-going collaboration and joint 
development are key to innovation.  The article maps out the governance problems that 
arise out of collaborative production relationships, and the new challenges they pose not 
only for antitrust, but also for the forms of contractual relationships among firms and the 
role of the intellectual property regime.  In the absence of guidance from doctrine, 
antitrust courts and agencies have steered away from imposing antitrust liability on 
antitrust defendants, relying instead on the design of novel remedial forms.13  Such 
remedies are sensitive to the complexities of the underlying problems and, rather than 
being court-centric, seek to involve a broader set of actors in the resolution of those 
problems.§14  To the extent that these novel remedial forms provide an effective antitrust 
reponse to the problem of governing collaborations, I argue that they supply the 
constructs of the new form of competition policy.
II.  The elaboration of antitrust doctrines
The antitrust doctrinal rules that courts continue to invoke emerged as the result 
of judicial efforts to balance the general terms of the statutory language with the public's 
changing attitudes towards the benefits of competition and its suspicion of business
conduct, as well as changes in industry relationships and forms of production.  The 
doctrinal framework has also been greatly influenced by legal policy factors, including 
the limits of the judicial capacity to engage in economic regulation within the confines of 
the common law method.  The legal tools of antitrust analysis are based on a 19th century 
statute and the subsequent century of doctrinal elaboration, consistently invoked in 
antitrust cases since the middle of the 20th century, both struggling to comprehend the 
new complexities of market interaction and organization of production.
While opting for a statutory entrenchment of the antitrust laws, Congress left both 
the text and the goals of the statutory provisions considerably vague. Therefore, in 
deciding antitrust cases the courts have to do more than just implement the law –
effectively, they have developed competition policy with little textual or contextual 
guidance. At its inception, the Sherman Act was m otivated by a set of concerns about 
concentrations of power in the hands of large economic conglomerates (or trusts), but the 
statutory standards were left vague because the goals of the legislation were largely
13 Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: The Matter of Remedies, 91 
GEO. L.J. 169 (2002) (emphasizing the importance of novel remedial forms).
14 Cf. Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:  How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1017-18 (2004) (observing similar trends in other areas of public law).
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inchoate.15  Both the scope and the application of federal antitrust law developed from the 
experience and learning that emerged from resolving actual antitrust controversies.
The decision to assign antitrust policy to the generalist courts has had two 
important consequences. First, relying on legal doctrine as the main vehicle for policy 
elaboration allowed the goals of antitrust policy to remain vague, since legal doctrine 
looks to the past for guidance and should not, at least in theory, be focused instrumentally 
on outcomes.  Thus, antitrust law could develop largely unhinged from any elaboration of 
the goals of antitrust policy, or how particular antitrust interventions could contribute
towards achieving those goals.  
Second, the elasticity of statutory language gave the courts flexibility to adjust 
legal doctrine to changing circumstances and experience.  However, this left antitrust law 
only with a long-term ability for learning and self-correction.  Legal doctrine is inherently 
path-dependent and the courts are not institutionally well-suited to monitoring and 
evaluating their own decisions, given the traditional judicial remedies and the particular 
preference for one-off remedies in antitrust cases. The law enforcement paradigm makes 
it difficult to monitor the effectiveness of individual interventions and remedies,16 and as 
a result, the opportunity to correct errors was likely to come too late and only after a 
backlash.  
A. The Warren Court and the makings of a backlash
In the post-War period,17 antitrust became an active area of government 
enforcement and judicial activity.  The progressivist suspicions towards concentrated
economic power and its effects on democratic politics of an earlier era were reinforced by 
the role played by industrial monopolies and cartels in buttressing totalitarian regimes in 
Germany and Japan before and during the War.18 Such a view guided government policy 
15 Judge Leval has used the Sherman Act as the paradigmatic example of a delegating statute 
implementing a new policy in very imprecise terms to be elaborated by the common law method.  Pierre N. 
Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J. L. & THE ARTS 187, 197 (2003).
16 Waller Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. 
L. J. 1, 31 (1951) (“[T]he government has … won many a case, but lost many a cause”.).
17 Earlier attitudes towards antitrust were far more ambivalent. During the Great Depression, there 
was growing suspicion towards the deflationary effects of ruinous competition and against active antitrust 
enforcement. ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 86-
91(1995) (describing the shifting attitudes to the antitrust laws and to competition more generally by the 
late 1930s).
18 DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING 
PROMETHEUS 147-48 (1998) (the German Nazi government overturned the cartel regulation, required the 
formation of cartels and sought to integrate them into the state apparatus).  See also GARY HERRIGEL, 
INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTIONS: THE SOURCES OF GERMAN INDUSTRIAL POWER 139-40 (1996).
ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE 6
more broadly, and the U.S. promoted an active antitrust policy, both at home and abroad, 
as a democracy-enforcing tool.19 Chastened by earlier judicial forays into economic 
regulation20 and in an environment of deference to the other arms of government, the 
Court endorsed a view of antitrust as a procedural tool that guarantee s the vibrancy of the 
competitive process so as to ensure opportunity, representation and democratic control 
over economic agglomerations.21
The economic effects of antitrust intervention were not at center stage, and to the 
extent such effects were relevant to antitrust decisions, early antitrust economics was 
supportive of an interventionist competition policy.  The structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm, current in the then nascent field of industrial economics, suggested the 
existence of a direct and causal relationship between a concentrated market structure, 
exclusionary firm conduct and poor market effects.22  Low market concentration, and the 
absence of restraints on the atomistic conduct of small (price-taking) firms were thought 
to be conducive to superior market performance and beneficial for consumers. If 
consumer welfare was one part of the antitrust calculus, it was certainly not the sole or 
even the determinative criterion.  An active antitrust enforcement aimed to ensure that 
markets were open in order to protect the economic opportunities of smaller producers to 
compete on the merits, without being foreclosed by larger, established enterprises.  This 
is another way in which the progressive flavor of the Court's antitrust jurisprudence was 
consistent with its focus on the emancipation of individual rights and opportunities and 
its view of the proper judicial role in a democracy.
Given those views, the Warren Court rapidly expanded the category of 
prohibitions on conduct and inter-firm restraints declared per se illegal, at a high level of 
generality and across different markets.  The Court was particularly sensitive to the 
difficulties associated with a full-fledged analysis of the market effects of particular 
contractual restraints, or conduct, or mergers under the rule of reason. Instead, the courts 
relied on retrospective identification and characterization of conduct and on proxies, such 
as evidence of the firm's anticompetitive intent. If they lacked understanding about 
19 Harry First, Antitrust in Japan: The Original Intent, 9 P AC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (2000).
20 By 1937 the Supreme Court pulled back from any constitutional economic supervision of 
Congressional legislation and yet in subsequent years courts began to reassert their authority, not only in 
areas such as racial discrimination, civil liberties, but also in new forms of economic regulation where 
common law institutions were seen to be well-adapted to the post-New Deal context. See John F. Witt, The 
King and the Dean, unpublished manuscript (46-47) (on file with the author).
21 See, e.g., JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981); Gary Minda, Antitrust at Century's End, 
48 S.M.U.L. REV. 1749, 1763-65 (1995).
22 See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION:  THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES 
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956) (viewed as the progenitor of the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm).
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certain apparently restrictive conduct, courts tended towards outlawing it with very 
sweeping statements.23 By contrast, for conduct which was found not to fall within a per 
se prohibition, the courts were reluctant to undertake a complete inquiry into both the 
reasons and likely effects of the impugned business practice, so that rule of reason 
analysis amounted to de facto legality.24
The Warren Court was not necessarily hostile towards claims of productive and 
other efficiencies that might result from different forms of integration or collaboration.25
However, the doctrine limited judges and juries to enforcing a set of procedural rules of 
the game, rather than becoming involved in substantive evaluation and weighing of 
efficiency claims, or assessment of how speculative efficiency gains would be 
distributed. Such an approach was orthodox, since ex post balancing is not a good ex ante 
guide for firm compliance. Judicial modesty combined with judicial ignorance lead to 
judicial over-reaching, but the doctrine was consistent with prevailing social attitudes and 
the dominant view in industry economics. Often in the same breath, the courts professed 
ignorance about competitive dynamics, but denied themselves the opportunity to 
overcome this:
The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining
difficult economic problems.  Our inability to weigh, in any 
meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector 
of the economy against promotion of competition in 
another sector is one important reason we have formulated 
per se rules.
In applying these rigid rules, the Court has 
consistently rejected the notion that naked restraints of 
trade are to be tolerated because they are well intended or 
because they are allegedly developed to increase 
competition.26
To foregoing approach led to a substantial broadening of the category of per se
prohibitions and this led to the ultimate backlash against antitrust intervention for two 
reasons.  First, the restrictive doctrine imposed serious limits on inter-firm contracting 
23 See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
24 Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania 
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977).
25 Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade 
Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 211-12 (2005) (referring to merger cases where the Court refused to 
consider efficiencies as a defense).  Even the firms proposing a merger in most cases cannot evaluate the 
likelihood of efficiencies, thus the significant number of failed mergers.  See Oliver Budzinski, Towards an 
International Governance of Transborder Mergers? Competition Networks and Institutions Between 
Centralism and Decentralism, 36 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 13 (2004).
26 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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practices and collaboration, which would not produce harm, except for inefficient 
competitors or opportunistic downstream firms.  Second, the bias in favor of per se 
treatment, the reliance on proxy evidence of anticompetitive intent (including easily 
discoverable general statements by management of plans to squash or destroy 
competition) and the availability of treble damages in private suits encouraged 
opportunistic use of the antitrust laws as a tool for market manipulation.  The antitrust 
regime was not a particularly precise or effective tool of re -distribution, since it could be 
misused to protect the inefficiencies and profits of market rivals under the guise of 
protecting competition.  Firms did not even have to spend resources to lobby or capture 
the enforcement agencies as a regulatory screening mechanism, since they could present 
their arguments directly to receptive courts and juries.
B. The Chicago New Learning
The Chicago School re-examination of antitrust doctrine took place in a context of 
broader disenchantment about the ability of government and bureaucracy to solve 
pressing social and economic problems.27 During and after the 1970s, public policy 
debates increasingly focused on the issue of the world competitiveness of American 
industry, and the antitrust regime was scrutinized for its effects on the ability of 
American firms to compete with foreign products.  The U.S. had cast itself in the role of 
the world's antitrust policeman,28 and yet U.S. firms found it difficult to withstand foreign 
competition even in U.S. markets. American firms have attempted to use domestic 
antitrust to fend off competition from Japanese firms,29 and even to pry open Japanese 
markets for American firms.30 Irrespective of the underlying causes of differences in 
competitiveness, it was important for rhetorical purposes that Japanese antitrust 
enforcement was substantially more lax and yet, Japanese firms could deliver products to 
consumers at a better quality and price. This strengthened the perception that once U.S. 
firms were subjected to the rigors of foreign competition, U.S. antitrust policy could no 
longer afford to promote its non-efficiency civic goals.31
Chicago scholars proposed to make both the goals and the instruments of antitrust 
policy more pragmatic and accountable, drawing on economic explanations of the firm 
27 See Michael C. Dorf, After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1254 (2004).
28 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); United States v. Nippon Paper 
Industries Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
29 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
30 Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AMER. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1997).
31 Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down and Sideways, 75 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1781, 1798 (2000).
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and market interaction.32 The opening claim of Chicago scholarship was that antitrust 
policy could be made both coherent and accountable, by clarifying and limiting its goals 
to enhancing economic efficiency (or consumer welfare), so that the maximum level of 
output was produced at the lowest price.33 While market structure could affect other 
policy goals—distributional, political, civic or environmental—these made antitrust 
analysis too complex, and reduced the accountability of antitrust interventions.34 Such 
goals could be assigned to other, more appropriately targeted policies.  In an antitrust 
policy focused on efficiency, mere reliance on structural variables (such as firm size and 
market concentration) was a poor guide for antitrust decision-making.  Chicago scholars 
were particularly critical of the courts' unwillingness to hear possible legitimate 
justification for certain kinds of conduct or contractual restraints. Finally, picking up on 
the courts' lack of confidence in their own ability to analyze and control anti-competitive 
conduct, Chicago scholars pointed out that, quite apart from legal rules, firm conduct is 
subject to market discipline from existing or new rivals.
The Chicago New Learning was not a program for an ambitious antitrust policy to 
promote economic efficiency.  The main aim of the Chicago project was to curtail the 
growth of the per se prohibitions by emphasizing efficiency justifications for some of the 
contracting practices already condemned by the Court. Importantly Chicago scholars 
accepted and worked within the institutional constraints inherent in antitrust enforcement 
through the generalist courts.  In describing the limits of antitrust, Chicago scholars were 
relying (unsurprisingly) on the limits of law, but also (perhaps more surprisingly) on the 
limits of economics, because, as Easterbrook explained (i) economic analysis may have 
limited predictive powers; (ii) economists may only be able to fully explain the reasons 
for, and effects of, particular conduct only retrospectively and with the benefit of 
hindsight; and (iii) the judicial task of weighing anticompetitive against procompetitive 
effects and efficiencies may be either difficult or impossible at the time of a court's 
decision.35
In light of those limitations, Chicago scholars assert the conviction that unfettered 
markets should be treated as presumptively efficient, or at least that market outcomes are 
32 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) (this 
was the seminal book that became the manifesto of antitrust (non)enforcement during the Reagan 
Administration).
33 Fox, Modernization at 1144-45.
34 The foundations for this shift away from the “civic” and towards the “consumerist” grounds for 
antitrust had been laid much earlier, with Thurman Arnold's appointment as the head of the antitrust 
division of the Department of Justice in 1938. Brinkley, supra n.XX at 91.  See also  Michael J. Sandel, 
Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, 85 GEO. L. J. 2073, 2077-79 (1997).
35 Easterbrook, supra n.XX at 2-3, 39-40.
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less likely to be detrimental than government interventions.  In the absence of clearly
demonstrated restrictive effects on output leading to higher consumer prices, an antitrust 
intervention is not justified, since false positives of government intervention are likely to 
be more harmful than false negatives.36
C. Responses to Chicago
The New Learning had a profound impact on antitrust doctrine and the level of 
antitrust litigation in the U.S. because it was consistent with a growing understanding of 
the different role of the firm in production.  Courts were receptive to the Chicago 
prescriptions because they involved minimal adjustments to the standard approach of 
deciding antitrust cases.37 Accepting that courts have a limited capacity to engage in 
antitrust decision-making, the Chicago school did not advocate for a policy of learning. 
Instead Chicago scholars took the ignorance of the antitrust institutions, at least on the 
issue of efficiency, as a given and proposed a simple switch in presumptions: the default 
antitrust rule was to treat the conduct as legal and defer to business decisions.  The 
antitrust plaintiff has a high burden to show how conduct would enhance the defendant 
firm's market power to exploit consumers, and that this would not be corrected by 
existing or new entrants, assuming that the courts hear the plaintiff's explanation (in the 
same way that the courts previously invoked the per se rule in order to preclude 
explanations proffered by antitrust defendants).
The academic response to the Chicago New Learning in favor of a more robust 
antitrust policy has developed in two broad directions, both of which have had a limited 
impact on doctrine. Antitrust lawyers steeped in the earlier tradition, accept that in some 
cases the old antitrust doctrine was consistent with the Chicago insights, and in those 
cases economic arguments could guide antitrust decision-making.38 However, they also 
insist that courts must accommodate the economic considerations with in the established 
doctrine. A rule-based approach to antitrust adjudication has the additional benefit of a 
reasonably settled state of the law, providing greater certainty for business actors.  A 
more freewheeling (case by case) inquiry into the effects of conduct or mergers is 
36 Eleanor M. Fox, Consumers Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1714, 1719-20 (1986) (book 
review) (arguing that Chicago antitrust involves not only a methodological shift, but is underpinned by a 
particular social and political philosophy).  See also Gabrielle Meagher and Shaun Wilson, Complexity and 
Practical Knowledge in the Social Sciences, 53 BRIT. J. OF  SOC. 639, 662 (2002).
37 See, e.g, Continental T.V., Inc. v GTE Sylvania Inc.. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (exempting from per se 
treatment vertical non-price restraints used to control free-riding).
38 Fox, Modernization at 1180-81.
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regulatory and would increase the ex ante uncertainty about the legality of business 
conduct.  
On this view, the Chicago School reformulation of the goals of antitrust was also 
fundamentally illegitimate.  The early antitrust rules were sensitive to the broader 
political and social context in which competition law operates, and promoted civic 
objectives.39 Quite apart from the democracy-enforcing paradigm, the Warren Court
antitrust has been described as “humanistic,” and consistent with the promotion of the 
rights and the economic empowerment of systemically disadvantaged groups championed 
in its constitutional and civil rights jurisprudence.40 As Eleanor Fox  points out, a 
competition law regime that does not focus merely on market outcomes (such as 
consumer prices), but also maintains an open market architecture, protects the 
competitive process and the opportunities for new or smaller firms to bring their product 
to market and compete on the merits, is not necessarily detrimental to consumer welfare
either. This is provided that antitrust enforcement does not illegitimately shield inefficient
competitors.41
These and similar arguments, however, have not provided a basis for an antitrust 
resurgence, largely because they do not provide an institutional framework through which 
these broader considerations can be incorporated in antitrust analysis, without courts 
slipping into the excesses of the earlier era. In particular, it is not clear how a court can 
implement all those strictures and balance the various potentially legitimate 
considerations within the confines of an antitrust case.  The old antitrust rules were over-
inclusive and path dependent because in an adjudicative context antitrust cases presented
a zero sum game (whereby conduct is declared legal or illegal), judicial reasoning is 
backward looking and yet it has a precedential effect in other market settings. A court 
simply cannot regulate the competitive process, which is on-going, through one-off 
interventions adjudicating upon a particular practice.  Once the need to go beyond broad 
and over-inclusive rules of prohibition is accepted, antitrust decision-making must 
balance context specific considerations.  Even if scholars are willing to entrust this 
function to the courts,42 the courts are apparently not willing to accept it.  For similar
39 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051 (1979); Philip 
Areeda, Always a Borrower: Law and Other Disciplines, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1029, 1040 (hereinafter "Areeda, 
Always a Borrower").
40 Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down and Sideways, 75 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1781, 1798 (2000), Fox, Modernization at 1151-52.
41 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors, 26 WORLD 
COMPETITION 149, 162 (2003).
42 Steven C. Salop and R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly:  Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV 617, 671 (1999); Richard Schmalensee, Agreements 
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reasons, it is not helpful to insist that antitrust has traditionally embodied values other 
than economic efficiency, unless those values can be translated into rules that guide 
judicial decision-making in particular cases.43
The second line of research has been spurred by post-Chicago developments in 
the economics of industrial organization, with the growth of theoretical and empirical 
work that models  competitive market interactions.  Improved understanding of the 
connection between observed structural and behavioral market variables to future  market 
outcomes could identify situations in which anticompetitive problems are likely to arise.  
Post-Chicago antitrust accepts that the objective of a coherent and accountable 
competition policy is to enhance economic efficiency.  However, it also has greater faith 
in the assistance that economists can offer antitrust decision-making in predicting the 
likelihood of consumer price effects of given conduct in particular markets instead of 
relying on the (unverified) claim that market forces are self-correcting and thus erode 
entrenchments and abuses of market power, or at the very least do so faster than antitrust 
intervention.44
Antitrust doctrine in the U.S. is capable of incorporating the insights of modern 
industrial economics in at least two ways.  The first route is to rely on more sophisticated 
economic models in order to develop more nuanced ex ante rules describing conduct that 
would raise competition concerns.45 Such rules could come either in the form of per se 
prohibitions of unambiguously pernicious conduct or more general standards which, 
applied to particular contexts and cases, could help judges distinguish legitimate 
competition from anticompetitive conduct.  The alternative route is for the court to rely 
upon economic expert evidence in order to determine, on a case-by- case basis, whether 
the specific conduct is likely to harm consumers.46 Of course, these two methods of 
economic input into antitrust decision-making are not mutually exclusive.  Admission of 
Between Competitors, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 82, 112 (Thomas M. Jorde and 
David J. Teece eds., 1992).
43 For example, the argument that a more activist antitrust policy promotes democratic values by 
supporting the opportunities for self-sufficiency of smaller traders and by reducing the concentration of 
economic power, to ensure democratic control over corporations, does not supply a set of coherent 
principles which can provide concrete guidance for deciding particular cases.  At best, it is a heuristic that 
is available for courts to use in deciding how to set the presumptions (e.g., mistrust of business conduct) or 
burdens of proof and even in doing that, courts cannot rely on any jurisprudential or theoretical arguments, 
presumably having to rely either on their own or on society's attitudes.
44 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual 
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1766 (2003) (post-Chicago antitrust prefers "accuracy over 
ease")
45 Areeda, Always a Borrower at 1040.
46 E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (a firm may be able to 
exploit a set of captive consumers who will continue to purchase supplies even in the face of rising prices, 
due to the costs of switching to another rival).
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expert evidence to resolve a specific question in a particular case may help the 
elaboration of a rule that can be applied in later cases as precedent, assuming some 
degree of stability and similarity of competitive interactions across different markets.47
D. The incorporation of knowledge
However, the courts have not been too welcoming of the more nuanced post-
Chicago approach into antitrust decision-making. The incorporation of economic 
knowledge has been constrained both by the way in which economic knowledge develops 
and by the courts' ability to absorb such knowledge in decision-making and rule 
formulation.  After all, the main judicial tool is analogical reasoni ng and an important 
lesson of the Chicago revolution has been that analogies apparent at first sight may end 
up being poor and misleading guides to decision-making. Furthermore, as Philip Areeda 
observed, the process of incorporation of knowledge into doctrine is burdened by the fact 
that "[t]he needs and purposes of the law are not necessarily the same as the interests and 
objectives of the expert pursuing his own discipline."48
In a recent contribution examining the impact of economic expertise on antitrust 
doctrine, Lopatka and Page argue that courts do not rely on expert assistance in order to 
acquire the economic knowledge incorporated into doctrine.49  Instead of relying on 
expert input, courts develop "economic authority" through an unstructured common law 
method of "pragmatically examining the scholarly literature in the context of existing 
case law and adopting the most persuasive and plausible accounts" available at the time 
of decision.50 Lopatka and Page explain that this process of selection is influenced by 
"intuitions," "social visions," and "ideologies,"51 as well as legal process considerations 
about the institutional capacity of courts to process highly fact specific expert 
testimony.52  Furthermore, they recognize that once such economic authority is accepted 
into the doctrine even without expert input, it takes precedence over, and sets limits on 
the scope of expert testimony that a court can admit in a later case to demonstrate that the 
47 Areeda, Always a Borrower at 1036.
48 Id. at 1040.
49 John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in Antitrust 
Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 631 (2005).
50 Id., at 632.
51 Id., at 636.
52 Id., at 640-41.
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economic authority is either incorrect, or at least inapplicable to the circumstances of that
case.53
In light of this last conclusion, their view that "the informal process of economic 
authority has decisive advantages within the antitrust system"54 is surprising.  For 
instance, they argue that the process of unstructured selection is legitimate because it is 
based on the same foundations as the development of precedent.55  However, it was 
precisely the limitations of the method of analogical reasoning in antitrust cases that led 
to the excesses evident during the Warren Court era.  True, courts have legitimate reasons 
for setting up barriers to prevent additional context-specific factual inquiry, such as 
ensuring coherence in the law,56 and limiting the extent to which courts would have to act 
as super-arbiters of alternative economic theories.  This is especially important given that,
in most cases, economists do not come to unambiguous or unanimous predictions about 
either the purpose or the likely effects of the conduct in question. However, a more 
appropriate response to the contestable and evolutionary nature of economic, like any 
other knowledge, is to ensure that doctrine permits (and does not foreclose) further 
inquiry to both develop new learning and incorporate it into decision-making.
The problem of conflicting expert testimony in antitrust, as in other cases is often 
presented through the prism of the paid expert.57 On this view, the function of the courts 
in antitrust cases is impaired by the absence of truly neutral and competent experts, since 
experts hired by the parties will testify to any proposition in support of the case of their 
client.58  However, there are other explanations for expert contests. It may be that the 
difference of opinion among two economic experts is genuine, yet one economist has 
employed faulty reasoning or methodology. Or alternatively, even with both proper 
reasoning and methodology, the economists may arrive at a genuine disagreement about 
the competitive significance of the case, particularly if the outcomes of interest extend to 
the medium to longer term.  A survey of articles in the peer reviewed journals in any 
discipline will reveal numerous disagreements between experts even outside the litigation 
context. Whatever the reason for the contest, in most cases courts do not have the tools to 
resolve it.  Yet to deny the validity of such input altogether by invoking authority based 
on judicial "intuitions" and "ideologies" seems a peculiar response to this problem.5960
53 Id., at 643, 698.
54 Id., at 694.
55 Id., at 696.
56 Id., at 695.
57 Areeda, Always a Borrower at 1033-34.
58 Posner, supra n.XX at 939.
59 Areeda has argued that the solution to the problem of expert contests is through some form of 
institutional innovation.  One possible strategy for dealing with this problem whereby experts should be 
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Such a response is particularly problematic in light of the fact that the economic 
understanding of particular forms of conduct or market phenomena evolves , particularly 
since market structures, organizations and strategies change.  Antitrust decision-making 
relied on economic theory long before the Chicago School, even if such reliance was not 
openly acknowledged by judges.61 Controversy among economists about the welfare 
implications of past business practices continues long after those practices have ceased. 
Conduct which might be recognized as predatory or anticompetitive today, might not 
have been seen in the same way in the past, not only because economists understand the 
world better today, but also because the same conduct might not have been as important 
in the past. Yet, if the courts insist on filtering out the factual evidence about the context 
of current cases through the prism of past "economic authority" they fail to appreciate the 
ways in which current cases are different, or the ways in which conduct which was once 
benign may now be of concern, and vice versa.
In his book An Empirically Based Microeconomics62, Herbert Simon criticizes 
modern economic theory, arguing that economic modeling is detached from reality and 
cannot give concrete advice to policy-makers.63  In a thoughtful review of Simon's book, 
the economist Ariel Rubinstein explains64
[W]hat we really do in economic theory is to study 
arguments. Understanding what sort of arguments could be 
made about a situation does not guarantee our 
understanding of when this or any other argument will be 
made. And understanding arguments that people use is very 
far from predicting the kinds of things that economists 
attempt to predict or at least try to understand.
compelled to publish their testimonies in peer-reviewed economic journals, as a way of incurring reputation 
costs for testimony which is markedly implausible.  Areeda, Always a Borrower at 1036. However, Areeda 
recognizes that this proposal is impractical because it only (partially) corrects for the "hired gun" problem, 
but not the other reasons for contest and disagreement which could provide an obstacle to courts in 
resolving concrete antitrust problems.  Timing is crucial in this context.  Even if an expert has employed, in 
good faith, some form of faulty methodology, ex post publication will reveal this error later, after the 
judicial tribunal has already decided the case.  The key is to incorporate this process of peer-review into the 
resolution of the particular case.  See infra n.XX.
60 The only proposal that is seriously being considered by the Antitrust Modernization Commission 
to deal with the problem of contested economic expert evidence is for the appointment of independent 
experts by the court.  AMC asks panelists for details of assignment: Considering court-appointed economic 
experts, FTC:Watch No. 668, at 2-4 (Jan. 30, 2006).
61 Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
257, 259-65.
62 HERBERT A. SIMON, AN EMPIRICALLY BASED MICROECONOMICS (1997). 
63 See id. at 26, 63.
64 Ariel Rubinstein, Book Review, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1711, 1712 (1999).
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This view suggests both a glimmer of hope and an inherent limitation upon the use of 
economics in antitrust decision-making, including more theoretically ambitious economic 
modeling.  To the extent that economics seeks to understand the kinds of arguments that 
can be made about a particular situation, this gives us hope that economic learning can be 
incorporated into the legal regime.  After all, lawyering is all about crafting arguments 
that explain the reasons for, and likely consequences of, particular conduct as against the 
background of rules which regulate that conduct.  But to the extent that economics 
enhances our tools of argumentation and helps antitrust advocates, how does it help the 
decision-maker?  It might help the judge discard certain arguments, because they cannot 
validly be made in particular circumstances, but beyond that it only provides additional 
valuable arguments without necessarily giving further guidance on how to weigh them 
against each other — in order to determine whether anticompetitive effects are likely and 
in what timeframe — or, against other valid legal or policy arguments.  As a result, 
Lopatka and Page's "economic authority" may be nothing more than the courts'
formulation of a simple proposition that disposes of the majority of cases, relieving them 
of the responsibility to mediate and balance such arguments.
E. The law and economics of predation
The evolution in the law of predatory pricing provides a good illustration of the 
limits of the process of judicial learning described thus far.  During the early years, injury 
to a competitor in itself was seen as destructive to the competitive process. Putting a 
competitor out of business through aggressive pricing not only destroyed the productive 
capacity of a firm, in turn affecting the livelihood of the owners and employees, but also 
increased market concentration, eliminating the competitive constraint on other market 
players.  Predatory pricing was a vibrant area of public and private enforcement.  In the 
absence of a method to distinguish predatory from ordinary price cuts, courts relied on 
proxy evidence of anticompetitive intent. As juries were receptive to these claims, the 
lower courts frequently awarded large treble damage awards against price-cutting firms
even in cases where the defendant firm had insubstantial market share.  
Attempts to develop easily administrable rules, based on economic theory, that 
would provide a nuanced predation law have been unsuccessful.  At a time when there 
was little economic analysis of the predation phenomenon, Areeda and Turner used a 
simple economic argument, based on profit-maximization, to develop a simple rule that 
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guided both the courts the marketplace. 65 Under the Areeda-Turner test, below-cost 
price cuts were presumptively considered predatory, since such price cuts could not be 
profitable unless the firm was expecting at some future date to recover the losses through 
higher prices after the exit of some of its rivals.  While this rule was apparently elegant 
and relevant in different market contexts, attempts to apply it generated further 
theoretical and practical inquiries about definition and measurement of costs, as well as 
possible alternative explanations for low pricing.  To resolve such inquiries, required 
admission of factual evidence and therefore left the hands of juries and trial judges 
largely unrestrained. This undermined both the rule's elegance and its utility in 
discouraging opportunistic use of antitrust law.
Thus, the only way to impose discipline on this area of law was to foreclose the 
courts from considering predation cases.  In a number of discrete steps, the Supreme 
Court relied on summary judgment as a procedural tool66 and Chicago analysis of 
recoupment as a substantive or doctrinal tool to achieve this goal.  Chicago scholars 
suggested that courts should sidestep the costs inquiry, which had not proven to be 
particularly helpful or tractable, and focus instead on the likelihood of recoupment by the 
defendant firm. In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp67 the 
Supreme Court decided that analyzing the likelihood of recoupment was a threshold 
condition for a finding of predation.  To establish this rule, Justice Kennedy relied on 
three propositions.  First, while accepting that pricing below some measure of cost is the 
appropriate definition of predation, the Court did not specify the way to define or 
measure costs.  Second, a plaintiff in a predatory pricing case had to prove that the 
defendant was likely to recoup any losses from predatory pricing by raising consumer 
prices after the targeted firms were eliminated.  Finally, and perhaps more detrimentally, 
the Court accepted the then reigning Chicago view that predatory conduct was unlikely to 
occur or to succeed. However, this last point was not a fully theorized conclusion, and 
was based on only a limited number of empirical studies.68
An unfortunate effect of this formulation was that the doctrine precluded further 
examination or elaboration of any of the three claims that supplied its basis.  Implicitly
sidestepping the question of costs discouraged any further inquiry into an appropriate 
65 Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 699 (1975).
66 Matsushita Electric Industr. Co. v Zenith Radio Copr., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
67 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
68 See, e.g., Roland H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, ANTITRUST L. 
& ECON. REV., Summer 1971, at 105; Kenneth G. Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder 
Trust, 13 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958).
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definition and measurement of costs for the purposes of identifying below-cost pricing.  
Further, the Court explicitly discouraged lower court from examining the meaning and 
forms of recoupment that may make predation a rational anticompetitive strategy.  The 
claim that a firm was unlikely to recoup (and therefore engage in predation), signaled to 
lower courts that absent extraordinary circumstances, predation cases were to be disposed 
of at summary judgment.  Thus, no successful predation cases have been brought since 
Brooke Group, despite the fact that the economic learning has brought additional 
arguments and considerations to bear on the rationality of predation as an anticompetitive 
strategy.69
More recent economic modeling does not embrace the Chicago proposition that 
predation cannot be a profitable strategy for dominant firms.  To assist the courts in 
deciding predation cases, Bolton, Brodley and Riordan have collected the emergent 
economic consensus on predatory strategies.70  While accepting that the likelihood of 
recoupment provides an appropriate framework of analysis, they draw upon economic 
models that incorporate theories of strategic dynamic interaction among firms in the 
presence of imperfect information.  Such theories demonstrate how predation could be a 
rational and profitable strategy for a dominant firm in different market contexts.  Where 
an entrant has imperfect information about the cost structure of the incumbent firm, the 
incumbent may engage in predatory pricing in order to send the wrong cost signal to the 
potential entrant and deter entry; or a dominant firm selling in numerous markets may 
engage in predatory pricing against a firm in one market in order to establish a predatory 
reputation thereby deterring entry or price cutting in other markets in which it operates 
(recouping in those other markets, rather than the market where it cut prices); or a 
dominant firm may engage in predatory pricing in order to reduce the rival's short run 
profitability so as to induce its creditors (who are imperfectly informed about the entrant's 
potential) to withdraw their financing.71
The economic theories that Bolton, Brodley and Riordan draw upon dynamic 
modeling that incorporates more contextual factors and strategic considerations relevant 
to identifying novel forms of predatory conduct.  As with many other post-Chicago 
69 The key for a plaintiff to win a case of this nature is to avoid the characterization of predation, 
irrespective of the similarity of the underlying conduct.  Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (product integration and exclusionary practices); LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (loyalty rebates provide basis for a monopolization claim though not under predation law).
70 See generally Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: 
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239 (2000).  
71 Bolton, Brodley and Riordan go further and claim that observed through the lens of modern 
theory, predation was the best explanation for some antitrust prosecutions that Chicago scholars used to 
support the claim that courts or juries make false inferences of predation.
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models, the welfare predictions of those theories are highly sensitive to the starting 
assumptions of the model. According to Elzinga and Mills, given this lack of robustness
in predicitions, such models cannot be a useful guide to judicial decision-making because 
they cannot be translated into ex ante rules that would apply across different contexts.72
However, to reject such economic evidence simply because it does not easily 
translate into ex ante rules seems paradoxical.  If the welfare implications of particular 
theoretical models are highly dependent on the starting assumptions of such models , to 
answer the question of whether a model can be used to analyze the case at hand, the court 
must determine whether the market context of the case maps well onto the assumptions of 
the model.  Therefore, lack of robustness is not a reason to reject evidence (including 
factual evidence as well as expert assessment) that the market context under 
consideration is precisely the one in which predation is a rational strategy which is likely 
to harm consumers.  Instead, cases such as Matsushita and Brooke Group have 
encouraged courts to address the recoupment issue at the summary judgment stage, which 
necessarily involves a curtailed evidentiary record.73
The most recent DoJ prosecution of American Airlines for predatory pricing 
relying on the work of Brodley, Bolton and Riordan was also rebuffed at the summary 
judgment stage, although for different reasons.  Both the District Court74 and the Tenth 
Circuit75 accepted that modern economic theory puts some doubt on the Brooke Group
view that predation is unlikely to occur and even less likely to succeed.  Nonetheless, the 
Court concluded that the Department of Transport had not adduced sufficient evidence 
that American's strategy involved below-cost pricing to survive a motion for summary 
judgment, despite the fact that the government complaint relied on four alternative 
theories of cost to demonstrate that the prices were predatorily low.   The Court latched 
onto the difficulty in determining whether American had sacrificed profits, as part of its 
alleged predation strategy, due to the substantial portion of arbitrarily allocated costs
involved, because of American's coarse cost accounting.76
72 Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills, Colloquy: Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory, 89 
GEO. L.J. 2475 (2001). 
73 Courts have regularly invoked summary judgment as "particularly well-suited" to "the usual 
entanglement of legal and factual issues" in antitrust cases. Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat'l Cable Adver., 
L.P., 57 F.3d 1317, 1322 (4th Cir. 1995).  See Oksanen v. Page Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 708 (4th Cir. 
1991); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 475 (7th Cir. 1988); Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. 
Dr. Pepper Co., 725 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1984).
74 United States v. A.M.R. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (2002).
75 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in United States v. A.M.R. Corp., 335 
F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).  See Gregory Werden, The American Airlines Decision: Not a Bang but a 
Whimper, ANTITRUST, Fall 2003.  
76 A.M.R., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
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Thus, on either the Brooke Group or the American Airlines view, the antitrust 
plaintiff will have substantial difficulty getting past a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment.  The courts avoid entering the fray of deciding complex predation cases by 
either (i) invoking the incantation that predation occurs rarely and requiring a strong 
showing of likely recoupment (Matsushita and Brooke Group) or (ii) requiring a precise 
showing that the price was below some undefined measure of cost, which plaintiffs will 
generally be unable to do (American Airlines).77  The fact that both of these approaches 
dispose of cases on summary judgment suggests that courts consciously tie their hands 
from considering context specific evidence that might muddy the neatness of current 
rules, and open the doors to the jury presumably encouraging opportunistic plaintiffs.
F. Conclusion
The Chicago "New Learning," which advocated a minimalist antitrust policy, 
reflected not only dissatisfaction with the excesses of the Warren era antitrust, but also a 
number of wider social trends, including the shift away from production-based, towards 
consumption based communities of identity,78 as well as growing suspicion about the 
pernicious effects of the use of governmental or bureaucratic power vis-à-vis business 
power.79  Most importantly, the Chicago school sought to incorporate the growing 
understanding about the new model of the firm that had replaced the decentralized ante-
bellum economy of individual traders in arms-length relationships. The arguments used 
by Chicago scholars were well-accepted in organization theory and industry economics.80
They reflected the Chandlerian81 model of the corporation that had come to dominate 
U.S. industry since the end of the 19th century.  Firms, according to this model, were 
large multi-product organizations (structured by divisions) that were closed hierarchies, 
designed to generate rules in order to break down complex problems and goals into 
manageable tasks and to monitor the compliance of large numbers of subordinates in 
77 See Michael Riordan, Presentation to the Conference on the use of Economics in Competition 
Law, London, March 11-12, 2004. Riordan’s characterizes the approach of the courts in both Brooke Group
and American Airlines, as 'legal pragmatism,' resembling the view of legal minimalism advocated by Cass 
Sunstein.  Cass R. Sunstein, Supreme Court 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
78 Sandel, supra n. XX, at 2077-79. See also DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICAN:  THE 
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 89 (1973).
79 Dorf, supra n. XX, at 1254.
80 Sabel, Real Time Revolution at 107. 
81 After Alfred Chandler, the business historian who identified and described its features.  ALFRED 
A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE 21
performing those tasks.82 Minimization of transaction costs that stem from bargaining 
problems, shirking and other forms of subordinate opportunism, was the main driving 
force towards integration within the Chandlerian firm, and provided the underpinnings 
for the Chicago attack on antitrust hostility to vertical restraints and mergers.
Yet courts are not a particularly good venue for either promoting economic 
efficiency, or for trading off efficiency against other societal values.  Doctrine does not 
provide any useful guidance to courts in deciding modern antitrust cases based on the 
efficiency criterion. The existing categories of judicial analysis (such as the per se and the 
rule of reason) are largely empty, as courts grapple to adapt the  methods of a process-
based legal regime to an effects based (regulatory) policy.83 While the new antitrust is 
said to incorporate the benefits of economic learning, this is a very partial claim which 
masks the extent to which presumptions continue to play a role in antitrust decision-
making.  The doctrinal incorporation of economic learning is limited by the institutional 
limitations of the courts and is generally biased against intervention.  While some have 
endorsed the judicial development of "economic precedent," this is a dubious kind of 
precedent that does not reflect a wider economic consensus, but instead involves a 
judicial re-characterization of economic learning to adapt it into rules that dispose of 
cases, rather than engaging in searching economic inquiry.   
III. The new cases - the innovation perspective
A. The Post-Chandlerian firm
While the Chicago antitrust revolution took place long after the emergence of the 
Chandlerian firm, the world that the law regulates is not static either.84 Parallel with the 
efforts to update antitrust law and doctrine to incorporate the lessons of industrial 
organization, the past two decades have witnessed fundamental shifts in the nature and 
the organization of the firm, the methods of production and competition, as well as the 
purposes and forms of inter-firm relationships.  By contrast to the integrated hierarchical 
firm, the emerging post-Chandlerian business organization is described as "federated and
open"—relying on collaboration, rather than integration—and "networked" so that 
82 Roberts, Modern Firm, at 1-2; Sabel, Real Time Revolution at 107-08. 
83 Matter of Polygram Holding, Inc. (The Three Tenors), 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ¶15,453 (FTC 
2003). 
84 Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a 
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L.R. 601, 637 (2001).
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information flows not only top-down, but also upwards and sideways.85 The profound 
changes taking place in the principles of business organization have a few important 
features:86
Firms have changed the scope of their activities, typically 
refocusing on their core businesses and outsourcing many 
of the activities that they previously regarded as central. ... 
Many have also redefined the nature of their relationships 
with customers and suppliers, often replacing simple arms 
length dealings with long-term partnerships.  ... By these 
measures, coupled with improved information and 
measurement systems and redesigned performance 
measurement systems, they have sought to increase the 
speed of decision-making and to tap the knowledge and 
energy of their employees in ways that have not been tried 
before.  To facilitate coordination and learning, they have 
experimented with linking people in different parts of their 
organizations directly, so that communications are more 
horizontal and not just up and down the hierarchy.
The shift in organizational structure was precipitated by the limits of the hierarchical 
model of the Chandlerian firm in resolving the problems of industrial organization, as 
well as shifts in the underlying market environments in which the new firm has to 
operate.  In particular, given changes in technology and the intensification of global 
competition, market changes are more rapid and on-going, which is why the environment 
in which the modern firm operates is described as more "turbulent"87 or "volatile."88  Top 
executives neither possess the information about market changes and new technologies, 
nor can they absorb such information rapidly enough to use the knowledge to formulate 
strategy top-down.89  The new firm is vertically disintegrated, making deeper 
collaboration and information exchange among firms essential.90 As a corollary, such 
novel forms of organizing production present new challenges in governing inter-firm 
relationships.  Since antitrust is a tool for moderating inter-firm relationships, the new 
forms of production present novel and unique antitrust challenges.  
85 Sabel, Real Time Revolution at 107.
86 Roberts, Modern Firm at 2.
87 Id. at 27.
88 Sabel, Real Time Revolution at 108.  
89 Roberts, Modern Firm at 27.
90 Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, Neither Modularity nor Relational Contracting: Inter-firm 
Collaboration in the New Economy, 5 ENTERPRISE AND SOC'Y 388, 389 (2004).
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B. Innovation
Because the underlying market environment in which the new firm operates is 
fast-changing and turbulent, a key aspect of firm success in new markets is not planning
and cost-minimization, but continuous innovation enabling the firm to adjust its decisions 
and be responsive to market changes that are very difficult to predict.  In this context, the 
firm's key challenge is not to minimize the cost of producing and delivering an existing 
product with a stable demand to the market, but instead to ensure that its product design 
keeps up with the future requirements of the market.  Such a change of focus also opens 
the door to different kinds of anticompetitive strategies, which aim to disrupt a 
competitor's ability to innovate.  In an increasing number of antitrust cases the effects of 
market structure and conduct on the ability to firms innovate (and consequently the pace 
of innovation) have assumed center stage.  Some commentators have gone so far as to 
suggest that promoting innovation is the primary goal or the touchstone of the modern 
competition policy.91
At least at the conceptual level, there is no reason for an efficiency-minded 
competition policy to be focused only on static allocative efficiency and conduct that 
restricts output and raises short run prices, without being concerned about dynamic 
efficiency, namely development of novel products and processes of production.  In 
dynamic modern markets, the introduction of new products or processes is the main form 
of firm rivalry that dissipates supra-economic profits and improves consumer welfare.
However, moving from the conceptual to the practical, we have already shown 
that a key constraint on extending the mandate of antitrust policy has always been the 
institutional capacity of the antitrust decision-makers to take a broader range of issues 
into account and to formulate and supervise effective remedies.92  Both the traditional and 
the Chicago approach to antitrust intervention deny any possibility for judges to trade-off 
some goals against others.93 The old caselaw often made the point that protecting the 
competitive process is the "law of the land" and courts had no mandate to trade-off 
91 Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New 
Economy, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 535, 540 (2001), Timothy Bresnahan, Remarks at the Fair Trade 
Commission of Japan Inaugural Symposium: Designing the New Competition Policy, “Pro-Innovation 
Competition Policy:  Microsoft and Beyond, Address Before the Competition Policy Research Center” 
(Nov. 20, 2003) (on file with the author).
92 Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: Should Judges and Juries Make It?, in
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 29, 32 (Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece eds., 1992).
93 Minda, supra n. XX, at 1766.
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competition for other socially desirable goals.94 Similarly, the Chicago view is deeply 
suspicious of judicial balancing and sees the focus on short-run allocative efficiency as 
the only way to anchor judicial decision-making far from error.  T he promotion of 
innovation and industrial progress—whether they were consistent or in conflict with the 
reigning antitrust view of competition—could be left to the market or to more targeted 
policy interventions by the other arms of government.
In the aftermath of increased antitrust litigation in high technology industries, 
Posner observed that "antitrust doctrine is supple enough, and its commitment to 
economic rationality strong enough, to take in stride the competitive issues presented by 
the new economy."95 By contrast, Posner singles out the institutional constraints as more 
significant, including the absence of neutral expert assistance to courts, the slow pace of 
litigation compared to the dynamic and fast-changing nature of the markets, and the fact 
that this dynamism exacerbates the difficulties in fashioning and supervising effective 
antitrust remedies.96
However, Posner's description of the doctrine as "supple" simply obscures the fact 
that in the absence of doctrine judges have no legal guidance in deciding these cases. As 
the F.T.C. recognized in the Three Tenors case,97 the distinction between the per se rule 
and the rule of reason has become largely blurred, with most cases inviting some degree 
of competitive effects analysis.  Similarly, the distinction between vertical and horizontal 
inter-firm relationships is not as critical in modern markets—the modern firm is vertically 
disintegrated, and collaborates with many different firms who are at least potential 
participants in the same market.  Some of the staples of antitrust analysis, including 
defining markets, calculating market shares, and comparing prices to cost have become 
strained and of limited assistance in new economy markets.98  The fact that there are no 
ex ante rules to constrain judicial discretion, does allow courts to engage in the kind of ex 
post, all things considered, judging of what's best for economic efficiency that Posner has 
advocated elsewhere.99 Those who have greater faith in the judicial capacity to perform a 
94 See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (courts do not trade-off 
competition against other policy values, such as public safety, under rule of reason analysis).
95 Posner, supra n.XX at 939.
96 Id.
97 Matter of Polygram Holding, Inc. (The Three Tenors), 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ¶15,453 (FTC 
2003).
98 The Microsoft illustrates some of these issues. Market shares may not be a significant guide if 
firms compete for the market and if a rival can easily dislodge a dominant incumbent with a superior 
product given the low marginal costs of (re)production of products like software.  Similarly, identifying 
predatory conduct by reference to the price-cost tests becomes more strained in the presence of increasing 
returns to scale where variable costs of production approach zero.
99 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L.J. 1 (1996).
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central role in antitrust decision-making and the judicial process to cope with the 
increased complexity, deny that even the institutional problems identified by Posner are 
significant or insurmountable.100
Yet the evidence suggests that the institutional limits of the judicial process as a 
format for resolving antitrust problems in contemporary markets is broader than the 
problem of limited access to truly neutral expert assistance.  As already shown, access to 
an economic expert independent of the litigating parties does not guarantee the proper 
incorporation of knowledge into antitrust decision-making.  Further, given the complexity 
of modern technologies, analysis of competitive dynamics in such markets is inherently 
multidimensional, and the need for expert input goes beyond economic analysis, to 
evidence from experts from other fields (including engineers, scientists, programmers) on 
issues of design, capabilities and robustness of alternative designs, the need for 
interconnectivity between different products and so on.  In this context, even where 
independent expert assistance is available, the more challenging problem is to facilitate
the communication among experts, and with the decision-maker, so that different 
conceptual schemes and perspectives for problem-solving can be brought to bear not only 
to identify the problem, but also in formulating workable solutions.
C.  New rules of deference
Given the technological and economic complexity of new production 
relationships, and the antitrust courts' hostility towards context specific factual 
evidence,101 the initial judicial responses to antitrust cases involving high technology 
industries tended towards fashioning new rules of deference to business conduct.  The 
bias against antitrust involvement was the result of a general preference for broad and 
easily applicable doctrinal rules and legitimate fear that any other strategy would place
courts at the center of decisions ordinarily left to the market.  Whatever difficulties courts 
face in gauging price effects, predicting effects on innovation involves qualitative 
judgments about which firm's innovative efforts would make a greater contribution to 
social welfare.  
100 Lawrence A. Sullivan, Is Competition Law Possible in High Tech Markets?: An Inquiry into 
Antitrust, Intellectual Property and Broadband Regulation as Applied to "The New Economy," 52 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 41, 42 (2001) ("the inherent strengths of a judicial process open to information and analysis 
make application of settled antitrust rules to the new economy markets feasible, if difficult.")
101 See, e.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (denying DoJ 
request for injunction and rejecting evidence from the customers of the merging parties that the merger is 
likely to have anticompetitive effects).
ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE 26
(1) Product Development as a trump
Product development decisions are ordinarily the prerogative of the firm that 
brings the product to market.  Product development succeeds when the firm makes the 
product more attractive for current users.  However, product development decisions can 
also have exclusionary effects on rival producers.  For example, a producer of two 
products can integrate them technologically.  While this may bring efficiencies to current 
users, it can also foreclose sales for a firm participating in one market only.  Or, 
alternatively a firm may develop a product which is not compatible and does not 
interoperate with those of its rivals, again with potential exclusionary effects. 
Where such conduct is subjected to antitrust scrutiny, one can envisage two 
possible responses by the courts.  One would be to subject the integration to a full rule of 
reason analysis, balancing the efficiencies reaped by consumers from the integrated 
product, against the exclusionary effects on rivals and the consequential net effects on 
prices or innovation in the market.102  As Salop and Romaine have pointed out, if courts 
shy away from performing this balancing task, they would be dealing themselves out of 
antitrust, since this is precisely the area in which many contentious issues are likely to 
arise in modern markets.103
However, courts have refused to perform this function not because they are anti-
antitrust, but because, in the absence of doctrinal guidance, they do not have the tools 
with which to perform this task effectively or legitimately, and in a way which would 
provide actors with a clear guide to compliance.  In the first iteration of the government's 
litigation against Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit refused to entertain the DoJ's claim that by 
combining the browser Internet Explorer with the Windows operating system, Microsoft 
violated the prohibition on product integration in the consent decree that settl ed the 
original DoJ complaint.  Microsoft had argued that the combination was a single product 
since the code of the browser was technologically inseparable from the operating system.  
Given the technological complexity involved, the D.C. Circuit adopted a highly 
deferential standard for product integration cases in high tech markets, whereby an 
antitrust defendant would prevail so long as it "could proffer any plausible non-pretextual 
product improvement explanation for the integration" of the two products, irrespective of 
102 Richard Schmalensee, Agreements Between Competitors, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITIVENESS 82, 112 (Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece eds., 1992).    
103 Steven C. Salop and R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly:  Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV 617, 671 (1999).  
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the significance of any exclusionary effects on rivals.104 If it were otherwise, the court 
would be engaging in picking winners and firms would be unable to foresee whether their 
product design violated the antitrust laws.
In the government's subsequent prosecution of Microsoft for violating § 2 of the 
Sherman Act, the en banc  opinion of the D.C. Circuit retreated from the above deferential 
standard, but this was only an apparent retreat.105 As a matter of doctrine, the Court’s 
method for analyzing the §2 claim has widely been interpreted as an endorsement of the 
rule of reason balancing approach,106 ultimately requiring a judicial determination 
whether any exclusionary effects asserted by the plaintiff were outweighed by pro-
competitive or efficiency justifications asserted by the defendant.  However, in deciding 
the case on the merits the D.C. Circuit avoided having to provide a method for 
performing the balancing task by rejecting Microsoft's proffered business or efficiency 
justifications for most of the impugned practices. In fact, in every instance where the 
Court accepted Microsoft’s asserted justifications, such as the development of the 
incompatible Java virtual machine, the conduct was not condemned.107  Thus, the method 
espoused in the Court's en banc opinion was facially different from that of the earlier 
panel, yet, in its application, it did not differ appreciably from the "any plausible ... 
explanation" standard.
(2) Intellectual Property as a trump
Protection of an antitrust defendant's intellectual property rights is another general 
rule of deference increasingly invoked by courts to justify antitrust non-intervention, even 
in cases where the plaintiff claims that an antitrust defendant's conduct would impair 
innovation.  The courts increasingly accept the proposition that protecting intellectual 
property rights is a trump card defense that an antitrust defendant can invoke against 
claims of antitrust violations.108  Such a proposition would substantially curtail the scope 
104 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (while technically the DoJ 
complained of a violation of the original consent decree, though the Court indicated that its decision was 
guided by the proper view of the law of tying under § 1 given the technological features of this market). 
105 See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
106 See Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Antitrust, Exclusionary Practices, and the 
Elusive Notion of Anticompetitive Effect, in THE FUTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL ANTITRUST – FROM 
COMPARATIVE TO COMMON COMPETITION LAW 87, 93-96, 110 (Josef Drexl ed., 2003); Sullivan, supra 
n.XX at 51-52.
107 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 75.
108 The strongest statement of this proposition comes from In re Independent Service Organizations 
Antitrust Litigation v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  See Timothy J. Muris, Remarks 
Before the ABA Antitrust Section Fall Forum, “Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way 
Ahead” (Nov. 15, 2001) (available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/intellectual.htm) (last visited on 
February 27, 2006) (commenting on the role of the Federal Circuit in altering the patent-antitrust balance)..
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for antitrust intervention in new technology markets, since these markets are 
characterized by the proliferation of intellectual property protection given the importance 
of innovation in market success.
The tendency to defer to intellectual property rights is a reversal of an earlier 
approach, when antitrust courts and agencies were very inhospitable to defendant 
justifications based on intellectual property rights.109 Such hostility was so deep rooted, 
that ownership of intellectual property placed an antitrust defendant in a disadvantageous 
position ever since the Supreme Court held that the ownership of a patent created a 
presumption that the owner possessed market power,110 making it more (rather than less) 
likely that defendants would be subjected to antitrust duties.
Yet judicial deference to intellectual property rights so as to defeat any competing 
antitrust considerations is based on both instrumental and institutional considerations.  
The former strict approach in favor of antitrust duties was bound to be re-evaluated, as 
antitrust moved away from reliance on broad per se rules towards a methodology more 
attuned to market effects.  Furthermore, if innovation is indeed the key aspect of 
competitive interaction in new economy markets, intellectual property rights, such as 
patents and copyrights, are legislative rights of exclusivity.  Those rights are created 
under a constitutionally conferred grant of power to Congress to promote the 
development of the sciences and arts,111 in light of the public good characteristics of 
innovation.
Whatever doubts courts might have about their ability to engage in the modern 
quasi-regulatory antitrust analysis, protection of property rights has been one of the tasks 
appropriate even for a minimalist judiciary.  Property doctrines are well-settled and the 
methods of analysis, at least in principle, rely upon retrospective characterization of 
rights and violations (even in the context of complex technological claims and 
industries), which seems an inherently judicial task.112 Furthermore, property law exalts 
the right to exclude as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
109 See, e.g., Bruce B. Wilson, Remarks Before the Fourth New England Antitrust Conference, 
“Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use, Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions” 
(Nov. 6, 1970).
110 United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). See infra n. 133. 
111 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
112 Contrast this to an alternative regime for intellectual property whereby the court would determine 
the optimal patent length on a case by case basis, by predicting the likely effects of the patent given the 
incentives for the patent owner and the competitive structure in the industry
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commonly recognized as property.”113 As Thomas Merrill has observed “no other right 
has been singled out for such extravagant endorsement by the Court.”114
More recently, the Court has abolished the presumption that patent owners 
possess market power, holding that the level of market power depends on the degree to 
which the product is effective and popular, as well as the availability of substitutes.115
The Chicago view goes a step further, being highly suspicious of the ability of firms in a 
market economy to become entrenched into positions of market power beyond the short 
run, absent government regulations restricting entry to the industry.116 Short-run and 
temporary acquisition of market power is not viewed as a problem, instead it supplies the 
incentive for firms to innovate or invest in infrastructure, where the advantages such 
investments confer are not perfectly appropriable by either the intellectual property 
protection or by other barriers to entry in the market.  
The foregoing view now apparently finds support in the Supreme Court, where in 
Verizon Communications, Inc.  v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, writing for the 
Court Justice Scalia explained that imposition of antitrust duties on an owner of 
infrastructure is both unappealing and difficult to supervise by the courts:
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an 
infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve 
their customers.  Compelling such firms to share the source 
of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying 
purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive 
… to invest in … economically beneficial facilities.  
Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as 
central planners.117
Although Trinko did not involve intellectual property, the reasoning is equally apposite to 
such a case, where a firm invests in R&D leading  to a commercializable invention that 
both confers on the firm an advantage in the form of a patent (or some other form of 
intellectual property protection), and makes that firm uniquely placed to fulfill a customer 
need.  To the extent that Justice Scalia’s dictum commands majority support on the 
Court, it suggests a highly deferential approach to intellectual property rights and a 
limited role for antitrust in such cases more generally.
113 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
114 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 735 (1998) (arguing 
that absent that right the owner is viewed as having no property).
115 Ill. Tool Works, Inc.v. Independent Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (owner of intellectual 
property does not necessarily possess market power).
116 In dynamic markets, market power is likely to be less durable. Pitofsky, supra n.XX, at 541.
117 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
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IV. Innovation - market structure and collaboration
Apart from the limited doctrinal guidance, the main constraint on the ability of 
antitrust to play an active role in promoting innovation is the absence of an apparent 
straight-forward relationship between the structure of the market and the rate of 
innovation.  However, an examination of actual practices that firms use in order to 
innovate in dynamic markets reveals that while incentives play an important role as a 
spur for innovation, an equally important consideration is how firms relax the constraint 
on their ability to innovate through learning about an increasingly complex world. 
Regardless of the market share it possesses, and the market structure in which it operates, 
the modern firm can only overcome the limitations of its own capacity and knowledge 
through collaborating with other organizations.  While such collaboration is clearly 
beneficial, it also makes the firm vulnerable to opportunism of its collaborators and it is 
precisely the context in which antitrust cases in high technology industries arise.
A. The link between structure and innovation
Positing a relationship between market structure and the rate of innovation is even 
more elusive than the link between market structure and output (or price).118 This inquiry 
is beset by numerous conceptual problems, including measuring innovation, which is a 
dynamic concept and because reliance on proxies, such as research and development 
expenditures, is manifestly inadequate.119 An examination of three important 
determinants of innovation (incentives to innovate, capacity to invest in innovation and 
capacity to acquire knowledge), demonstrates that neither a decentralized market of 
atomistic firms, nor a concentrated market characterized by large firms can guarantee 
rapid learning and innovation.  
In a decentralized market of atomistic firms, multiple innovation sources and 
competition among firms to bring a new product to the market could lead to faster rates 
of innovation, as well as a less concentrated product market once the product is 
developed and the technology dissipated.  Innovative ideas are more likely to emerge 
from new and/or small enterprises that do not have an existing and secure stream of 
118 Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 
ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 27 (1995).
119 Id. at 27 ("Innovation is intangible, uncertain, unmeasurable, and often unobservable, except in 
retrospect.")
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profits.120  Yet small firms can only access local knowledge and might not have the 
funds, or the incentive, to invest in commercializing the innovation, particularly since it 
would be difficult to appropriate the benefits of such investments.  
Nor is a large firm in a concentrated market a guaranteed to generate rapid 
innovation.  Larger firms can take advantage of economies of scale and efficiencies in 
research, development, but also in subsequent production and commercialization of an 
innovative idea.  Bigness and high market concentration can also provide the capacity to 
invest in R&D, because the firm can more readily finance such expenditures out of 
existing profits.  Furthermore, a firm that controls a larger share of the market can 
appropriate the benefits of innovative investments more easily, and appropriability of 
such investments is only enhanced by the robust protection of intellectual property rights.  
However, large incumbent firms may also face problems in generating innovative 
ideas.  Larger enterprises have quasi-bureaucratic governance and management 
structures. Decision-makers within such organizations tend to rely on branch-knowledge 
in formulating new decisions and policies.121 In particular, new decisions are highly 
contingent upon the familiar decision-steps that have taken the organization up to this 
point122 and, as a consequence, they will often be blind to solutions which are well 
outside tried and tested routines.  Scholars of large incumbent firms have noted that such 
organizations are good at developing "sustaining" innovations, which are based on small 
and incremental engineering improvements that serve existing customers.123
As Bendor demonstrated,124 two independent persons working on the same 
problem are more likely to develop a solution working separately than together, even if it
is assumed that "success breeds success" (so that if the individuals work together, the 
conditional likelihood of the second team member successfully solving a second problem 
given that the first member has already developed one good solution, is higher than if the 
two individuals worked separately).  Thus, somewhat counter intuitively, "[i]f what is 
120 Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of 
Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 574-76 (1995). 
121 Charles Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 80 (1959).
122 Id. at 81.
123 Clayton M. Christensen, The rules of innovation, 105/5 TECHNOLOGY REV. 32, 38 (2002);
Clayton M. Christensen, Mark W. Johnson & Darrell K. Rigby, Foundations for Growth: How to Identify 
and Build Disruptive New Businesses, 43/3 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REV. 22, 23-24 (2002); Clayton M. 
Christensen and S. L. Hart, The great leap: driving innovation from the base of the pyramid, MIT SLOAN 
MANAGEMENT REV., 44/1: 51–6 (2002).
124 JONATHAN BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS: REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT (1985); GARY J. 
MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS 79-80 (1992) (hereinafter "Miller, Managerial Dilemmas").
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important is that at least one good idea occurs, the pair working separately is 
unambiguously more likely to achieve that criterion of success."125
The lesson from both Lindblom and Bendor's treatment of the limits on 
developing new solutions is that, even within a large enterprise, management will need to 
generate some degree of diversity and independence if new, innovative and commercially 
successful ideas are to be developed.126  However, fostering diversity within the firm is 
no easy task.  Determining the optimal level of diversity and delegation, as well as 
selecting from among different project-ideas generated by different units, may be a near-
impossible task given the limited knowledge of management.127 Further, diversity and 
delegation create agency problems in the form of separate power bases within a firm,
each with their own interests distinct from those of the firm, producing the risk of 
bargaining failures as well as the possibility of collusive conduct among different firm 
divisions to advance purely local interests.
B. Between market and hierarchy - collaboration
One way that the modern firm can garner the benefits of both decentralized 
production modes and integration is through inter-firm collaboration.  Collaboration 
allows the firm to access other sources of knowledge from other market participants who 
are attempting to solve a similar problem, to pick up promising ideas from such sources 
and jointly develop solutions, instead of fostering optimal diversity within the firm. 128
Such outside sources of knowledge can come from the firm's suppliers or other vertically 
related enterprises, but also the firm's customers,129 its current or potential competitors, 
enterprises operating in very different industries130 and others.131
125 Miller, Managerial Dilemmas at 80; Bendor, supra n.XX at 47.
126 John S. Brown & Paul Duguid, Creativity versus structure: a useful tension, MIT SLOAN 
MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 42/4: 93–4 (2001).
127 It may require substantial amount of information and panoptic vision in order to determine the 
optimal degree of diversity, perhaps almost as much as would be necessary to actually develop innovative 
solutions.
128 Alice Lam, Embedded firms, embedded knowledge: problems of collaboration and knowledge 
transfer in global cooperative ventures, 18/6 ORGANIZATION STUDIES 973, 973 (1997) ("in the high 
technology industries where a single company rarely has the range of knowledge and experience needed for 
timely and cost-effective product innovation, forging cooperative links with external partners has become a 
necessary part of firms' cost and risk reduction, and more importantly for access to knowledge and 
capabilities unavailable internally.")
129 Mohanbir Sawhney, Don’t Just Relate —Collaborate, 43/3 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REV. 96 
(2002) (collaborative innovation includes firms tapping into user experience and integrating it into the 
product development process).
130 Andrew Hargadon & Robert I. Sutton, Technology brokering and innovation in a product 
development firm, 42/4 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 716–49 (1997) (firm operating as a 
ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE 33
The sociological literature examining innovation practices of firms in new 
technology markets observes a marked trend towards cooperative, simultaneous and 
"experiential" innovation, that produces successful and (importantly for a dynamic 
environment) robust forms of problem solving and product development.  In a study of 
different innovation models pursued by firms in the high-paced computer industry, 
Brown and Eisenhardt observe those firms do not rely on bursts of radical change 
emerging from tightly structured design processes with extensive planning and a 
substantial investment in one version of the future.132 Instead, innovative change is 
continuous and adaptive, relying on experimental products and strategic alliances.  
Brown and Eisenhardt observe that either the "planned" or the "experiential" 
innovation strategy may be appropriate for a particular firm, depending on the underlying 
market environment and structure.133  The planned (lock-step) process is appropriate in 
more "certain" environments where underlying changes occur more incrementally and are 
therefore more predictable.134 Experiential development strategies emerge in market 
environments which are unpredictable, intractable and uncertain, where players must rely
on accelerated learning, real time interaction, iteration and flexibility.135
Long before the more recent antitrust caselaw, Jorde and Teece described the 
tendency towards collaborative "simultaneous innovation":
[I]nnovation does not necessarily begin with research ; nor 
is the process serial.  … [I]t does require rapid feedback, 
mid-course corrections to design, and redesign.  This 
conceptualization … also recognizes the constant feedback 
between and among activities, and the involvement of a 
wide variety of economic actors and organizations that 
need not have a simple upstream-downstream relationship 
to each other. … R&D personnel must be closely connected 
to the manufacturing and marketing personnel and to 
external sources of supply of new components and 
complementary technologies so that supplier, manufacturer 
technology broker for clients operating in 40 different industries, to spread existing technological solutions 
in some industries to solve problems in others).
131 See, e.g., John Markoff, At Microsoft, Interlopers Sound Off Security, N.Y. TIMES, October 14, 
2005, at B1, B6 (to improve security of the system Microsoft organizes meetings with "white hat" hackers -
computer security researchers who expose vulnerabilities and were generally critical of Microsoft).
132 Shona L. Brown & Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, The art of continuous change: linking complexity 
theory and time-paced evolution in relentlessly shifting organizations, 42/1 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE 
QUARTERLY 1, 31-32 (1997).
133 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt & Behnam N. Tabrizi, Accelerating adaptive processes: product 
innovation in the global computer industry, 40/1 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 84–110 (1995).
134 Id. at 107-08.
135 Id.
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and customer reactions can be fed back into the design 
process rapidly.136
The post-Chandlerian open, federated and networked firm, arises precisely as an answer 
to this need for the firm to collaborate extensively and deeply in order to be able to 
engage in such on-going innovation.  
The nature of technology and forms of production in these markets alleviate some 
traditional antitrust concerns, while creating new ones.  For example, the rapid changes 
that take place in technology-driven markets make market power less durable, as new and 
better products can easily enter markets and quickly replace existing ones.  This
observation, coupled with the lack of a strong link between observable industry structure 
and the rate of innovation, which could be translated into easily administrable rules, 
might suggest a sanguine view about the relevance of a 19th century discipline in these 
modern contexts.137
However, since antitrust is a tool which aids to solve the problems in industrial 
organization, in order to improve the competitive operation of markets, such a sanguine 
view may be both too complacent and too skeptical.  If, on the one hand, this view 
reflects a belief that the new principles of industrial organization have solved all 
problems of inter-firm interaction, which might affect industry performance and 
consumer welfare, they are too complacent because problems in these relationships 
persist and are reflected in many modern antitrust cases.  On the other hand, the view that 
the problems are of such complexity that the existing antitrust institutions cannot 
effectively grapple with them may be too skeptical, since antitrust interventions in the 
U.S. as elsewhere, are already developing solutions that overcome the institutional limits 
of antitrust.
C. Reinterpreting the cases
A number of antitrust cases, in which the promotion of innovation provided a 
central pillar of the theory of the case and where the role of antitrust duties vis-à-vis 
intellectual property rights was a key issue, illustrate both the importance of collaboration 
and the need for collaborating firms to establish a common language, in the form of a 
136 Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation, and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 45, 49 (Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece eds., 1992).
137 Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Analysis in High Tech Industries: A 19th Century Discipline Addresses 
21st Century Problems, American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law's Antitrust Issues in High-
Tech Industries Workshop, February 25-26, 1999, Scottsdale, Arizona. (Available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/hitch.htm) (last visited on February 27, 2006).
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platform or standards that enable them to work together.  In this context, antitrust 
disputes result from break-downs in collaboration and attempts by one firm to appropriate 
the fruits of the joint collaboration, or prevent other collaborators from innovating.  This 
re-interpretation of the caselaw demonstrates that standard tools of antitrust analysis are 
of limited utility in resolving these problems, but also, as the Article will go on to argue,
that an absolute view of the exclusivity of intellectual property rights might be a poor 
guide for decision-makers. 
(1) Intel
The FTC's complaint against Intel arose from a break down in a collaborative 
relationship due to a bargaining failure between parties over dividing the fruits of their
collaboration.  The case involved a deeply collaborative relationship between Intel, who 
with over 80 percent of the sales in that market is the dominant producer of 
microprocessors (the "central processing unit of a computer system"),138 and three 
companies producing microprocessor related technology (Digital, Intergraph and 
Compaq) that sought the assistance of the FTC.  As the FTC recognized, Intel's 
development and marketing of the microprocessor was dependent on cooperation with a 
many other firms:
Intel promotes and markets its microprocessors by 
providing customers with technical information about new 
Intel products in advance of their commercial release. ...  
Subject to [disclosure] restrictions ... Intel makes such 
information widely available to customers, including 
manufacturers of personal computers, workstations, and 
servers. Such relationships have substantial commercial 
benefits for both parties: Intel's customers benefit because 
the advance technical information enables them to develop 
and introduce new computer products incorporating the 
latest microprocessor technology as early as possible, and 
Intel benefits because those customers design their new 
computer systems so as to incorporate, and effectively 
endorse, Intel's newest microprocessor products.
This need to collaborate does not arise merely because Intel and the complainants 
produced complementary products that had to interoperate.139  As the FTC complaint 
138 FTC Complaint ¶ 6
139 Digital produced computer hardware and software systems that incorporated Intel 
microprocessors, Intergraph key products were computer workstations designed for sophisticated graphics 
applications that were based on Intel microprocessors.  Compaq produced computer systems products, such 
as personal computers, workstations and servers and was Intel's largest customer for microprocessor 
products. FTC complaint ¶¶ 16, 24, 33.
ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE 36
pointed out "Intergraph provided Intel with feedback that was essential for Intel's 
penetration of the workstation market and otherwise validated the use of Intel's products 
... for what was at the time a new market segment for Intel."140  Further, the three 
complaining companies were among the chief customers for Intel's microprocessors.141
Intel's decision to stop providing advance technical information to the three 
companies was prompted by their litigation alleging that Intel's products infringed their 
patents.  Any dispute between collaborators over the terms, and particularly the price of 
licensing intellectual property, is a dispute over the allocation of the joint surplus, 
irrespective of whether Intel's conduct did indeed infringe its collaborators' patents, or 
whether any infringement was conscious or accidental.142
As Commissioner Swindle recognized in his dissent from the final order, the 
FTC's theory of anticompetitive harm was somewhat unorthodox, since no chain of 
causation was specified from Intel's conduct to its ability to strengthen its market power.  
The complainant companies were not Intel's competitors. Nor were Intel's actions 
ultimately directed at any competitors or designed to strengthen Intel's monopoly in the 
microprocessor market.143 Even focusing on the ex post effects of Intel's conduct on 
innovation, Commissioner Swindle commented that there was no evidence that Intel's 
actions "threatened to harm the consuming public" or stem the "tide of innovation and 
improvement" in the industry.144
In response, the FTC majority argued, somewhat unpersuasively, that the consent 
order was a pre-trial settlement which "necessarily prevents [the Commission] from 
making any final judgment about the actual evidence of harm to competition from Intel's 
conduct."145 Notwithstanding this concession, the main concern for the majority 
Commissioners was to create conditions in which the disputing companies could resume 
their collaboration.146 Further, the majority were concerned about the effect that Intel's 
resort to self-help (in withholding crucial information) would have on the ex ante
140 FTC Complaint ¶ 24
141 Digital's Alpha was also, competitive with Intel's product and, similarly, Intergraph produced the 
Clipper microprocessor technology, although was no longer focusing on it.
142 Cf. Carl Shapiro, Technology Cross-Licensing Practices: FTC v. Intel, in The Antitrust Revolution, 
John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White (eds.) 350, 354, 356 (2004).
143 This argument was dispositive of the antitrust issues for the Federal Circuit in its decision against 
Intergraph in its litigated case against Intel. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 
1999).
144 Intel, Decision and Order 1999 FTC LEXIS 145 (Aug. 3, 1999) (Commissioner Swindle, dissent.)
145 Intel, Decision and Order 1999 FTC LEXIS 145 (Aug. 3, 1999) (Statement of Chairman Robert 
Pitofsky and Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony and Mozelle W. Thompson). 
146 Resumption of collaboration was ultimately in Intel's interest as well, which may be why Intel 
agreed to the consent order while at the same time vigorously denying that its conduct constituted a 
violation of the antitrust laws.
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incentives for inter-firm collaboration, where a firm which owns a platform can act as a 
gate-keeper with disproportionate power to make such a threat.147
(2) Microsoft before the European Commission148
Microsoft's collaboration with firms in the industry was also at the center of the 
European Commission’s complaint and decision that Microsoft  violated European 
competition law.149  The decision was based, in part, on Microsoft's refusal to provide
interoperability information to other producers of work group servers so that their servers 
could call up functions on the Microsoft Windows operating system, which runs on the 
vast majority of individual computers.  The Commission's final order was for Microsoft 
to fully disclose the information necessary to ensure complete interoperability to rivals, 
such as Sun and Novell.  The Commission emphasized the fact that Microsoft had 
previously provided full disclosure of such information.  However, once Microsoft 
developed, corrected and launched its own work group server, it ceased to disclose the 
full information and “disrupt[ed] previous levels of interoperability.”150
In defending its actions, Microsoft relied on its absolute prerogative as the owner 
of intellectual property rights, arguing that its conduct was necessary to protect its 
intellectual property and furthermore, was not inconsistent with vigorous competition 
with its rivals.  To the extent that Microsoft invested in infrastructure (including both the 
operating system and the work group server that interoperates smoothly with Windows), 
this gave Microsoft an advantage in serving customers needs (to use the Trinko
language).151 If this conduct could not strengthen Microsoft's power, i.e. if Microsoft 
cannot raise the price of the operating system or the work group server, and the 
consumers can obtain a server that interoperates seamlessly with the operating system, 
there does not appear to be consumer harm from Microsoft’s conduct.  
Apart from emphasizing that Microsoft’s conduct seriously impeded the rivals’ 
ability to compete in the market,152 the Commission argued that if Microsoft could refuse 
to continue the prior level of disclosure to its rivals, this would lead to a net reduction in 
147 Of course, it would have been impossible for the F.T.C. to compel the parties to resume their 
collaboration. Section V.C(2), infra, discusses the mechanics by which the F.T.C. attempted to restore the 
collaboration, with some criticism of its view that the intellectual property laws were the proper place to 
find the solution to the underlying problems between the collaborators.
148 The next section will also examine the U.S. government's case against Microsoft to focus more 
specifically on both the threats to innovation and the remedial efforts in the two cases. 
149 Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, Commission Decision (Mar. 24, 2004) (“Microsoft EU”).
150 Microsoft EU at ¶588.
151 See supra, n.126 and accompanying text. 
152 Microsoft EU at ¶589 (puts competitors at strong competitive disadvantage), ¶694 (prevents 
competitors from innovating), ¶1064 (interoperability information is indispensable).
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innovation, even if mandating disclosure would reduce the incentives for Microsoft to 
innovate.153  As Fox has pointed out, the Commission’s claims about ex post effects on 
innovation can be contested, particularly since Microsoft’s practices have not had a 
detrimental effect on the ability of Sun or Novel to compete effectively to the point where 
they might be eliminated from the market.  Further, at least at first sight the 
Commission’s claim of a negative net effect on innovation in work group servers may be 
viewed as speculative, and not rooted in the evidence.154 Focusing only on the ex post 
incentives, Microsoft’s refusal to provide full interoperability information might spur 
companies such as Sun and Novel to innovate more vigorously, to make their work group 
servers attractive to consumers or overcome any interoperability problem with the 
Windows operating system.  Furthermore, given the integrative efficiencies of bringing 
two complementary products within the same firm,155 Microsoft's integrated product 
could work much better than Sun or Novel's work group servers.
While the Commission’s decision was apparently based on its assessment of ex 
post effects on innovation, it is arguably better understood as an attempt to protect the 
incentives for collaboration, necessary to acquire knowledge that generates innovation.
Microsoft reaped benefits from its collaboration with Sun and Novel, as well as with 
other firms whose products used the Windows system, for at least two reasons.  First, 
given that Microsoft was not producing its own work group server, having work group 
servers that interoperate with Windows made Windows a more attractive operating 
system and strengthened the indirect network externality.  Such interoperation 
strengthened the applications barrier to entry, enhancing the dominance of Windows, as 
well as the value of Microsoft’s intellectual property in the operating system.  Second, 
information sharing between Microsoft and Sun or Novel in order to iron out problems 
and ensure the interoperability of their work group servers with Windows generated 
knowledge that would aid  Microsoft in developing its own work group server.
Microsoft’s refusal to continue to ensure full interoperability to its rivals may be 
condemned on fairness grounds, but beyond that, it can also stunt innovation by reducing 
the incentives for firms such as Sun or Novell, or venture capital investors that support 
such firms, to participate in similar collaborative relationships.  Furthermore, if 
Microsoft’s innovation is responsive or requires external sources of learning, the 
153 Microsoft EU at ¶783.
154 Eleanor M. Fox, Refusal to Deal: A Right or a Wrong?, Address at the Center for European Law, 
King’s College, London (Mar. 18, 2005).
155 Joseph Farrell and Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies:  
Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 98 
(2003).
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disincentive for collaboration arising from the power to unilaterally terminate such
relationships, dries up sources of learning and error-correction information, essential for 
the development of improved and new products even by Microsoft itself.  This produces 
not only a static misallocation of resources, whereby resources shift away from those 
products, but also leads to a loss in dynamic efficiency if it retards the rate of introduction 
of new and improved products on the market.  
(3) IMS
To illustrate the way in which the operation of the intellectual property laws can 
stunt innovation by arbitrarily assigning ownership over a joint product resulting from a 
collaborative effort to a single entity consider another European case, with far less 
remarkable facts. In IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 
the defendant IMS had copyright, under German law, in the "brick structure" that was 
used for the presentation of regional sales data in the pharmaceutical industry.156 As the 
European Court of Justice pointed out that, while IMS claimed the copyright, the brick 
structure was developed through a collaborative work group, organized by IMS, with its 
customers in the industry. The customers' supply of information and feedback to IMS 
was a key factor in the development of the brick structure, which was relevant to the 
question of whether IMS’s refusal to license the structure was abusive under the 
competition laws.157  Furthermore, what gave the otherwise unremarkable brick structure 
its value, was the decision by IMS’s customers to adopt it as the industry standard for the 
presentation of marketing information “to which they adapted their production and 
distribution systems.”158  IMS’s customers therefore had an important contribution and a 
stake in the development of IMS’s intellectual property.  The Court reasoned that if the 
plaintiff, NDC, could introduce new features to the brick structure that the clients might 
want or prefer, access to the brick structure to NDC should not be foreclosed by an 
absolute view of IMS’s property right.  To adopt such a view would provide a 
disincentive for the customers to engage in the collaboration in the first place.
The Court's decision is based on the premise that NDC was seeking access to 
IMS's copyrighted structure in order to build upon the brick structure which was the 
industry standard by developing an improved product that served some of the customers'
needs.  The Court noted that access to NDC could be granted only if “it intends to 
produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there 
156 Case C-418/01 (2003) at ¶3 ("IMS").
157 IMS at ¶30.
158 IMS at ¶6.
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is a potential consumer demand.”159 Given this last requirement, it is not true to say that 
European law is unambiguously more interventionist or more concerned with the 
interests of competitors, rather than consumers.160  The IMS decision discourages mere 
price competition with an identical product (in a way which might be permissible under 
the U.S. essential facilities doctrine,161 to the extent it survives Trinko), and instead 
promotes competition through innovation to build on a product in which the customers 
have an important stake.
V. Antitrust mechanisms for governance
If collaboration is essential for the new firm to be able to innovate, an antitrust 
policy that promotes innovation would need to provide mechanisms for managing 
continuing cooperation.  However, traditionally antitrust has not been viewed as a tool 
that fosters inter-firm collaboration.  Antitrust law is ordinarily deeply suspicious of firms 
coordinating their decision-making.  This suspicion can be traced back to Adam Smith's 
comment that "people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices."162  Smith did not think that there was anything the law could 
do to prevent such "meetings," but he also suggested that the law should do nothing to 
encourage or facilitate them either.163 This view reflected Smith's more general 
disapproval of any form of integration (including modern corporations) which restricted 
the freedom of the "workman" or "tradesman" and the discipline that competition 
imposed on them personally .164  Needless to say, this position no longer reflects the 
realties of industrial organization in the modern economy.  The need for collaboration 
among loosely linked firms, as a form of innovative problem-solving, is a response to the 
turbulence of the underlying environment in which the new organization operates.  To 
understand the role that antitrust can play in advancing such collaborations, we must 
understand both the problems that are likely to beset such team relationships, and the 
weaknesses of alternative instruments for resolving those problems.  
159 IMS at ¶49.
160 This is a widely held view about the difference between current European and U.S. competition 
law.  See, e.g., Fox, supra n.44 at 162.
161 Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson and Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under 
U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 460 (2002). 
162 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 148 (Edwin Canaan ed.,  Modern Library 2000) (1776).
163 Id. at 148.
164 Id. at 149.
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A. Problems in team production
Collaboration among different individual units in a problem-solving team makes 
it possible for individual team members to specialize, which generates both productive 
efficiencies and governance problems.  Specialization among different team members 
generates positive externalities, increasing the marginal productivity of each member, so 
that the total production of the entire team is more than the sum of the output that would 
be produced by each member individually.165 However, the interdependencies among 
team members lead to governance problems of at least three kinds: hidden action, hidden 
information and bargaining difficulties.  For example, a team member whose effort is 
difficult to observe by others can free ride on the efforts of others. While this reduces the 
total output produced by the team as a whole, it can increase the share of output (net of 
the cost of effort) to the shirking member.  Similarly, an individual team member can 
strategically misinform other collaborators about a piece of data possessed only by that 
member, again with the aim of increasing his or her share of the surplus produced in the 
joint collaboration. These governance problems create ex post inefficiencies, as well as ex 
ante disincentives to engage in team production in the first place.
The increased specialization that produces production efficiencies leads to an 
"increased inability to see the other person's point of view" as well as a "decrease in the 
likelihood that competitive market forces will solve coordination problems by ... the 
neutral operation of the price mechanism" because specialized team members are not 
easily substitutable.166 Ultimately, the team must also decide how to divide the jointly 
generated surplus between different team members, and such bargaining can be both 
prolonged and costly.167 If the parties have made relationship-specific investments that 
cannot be used with other collaborators, indispensable team members can engage in 
opportunistic hold-up of the negotiations.  This can increase the transaction costs of 
bargaining substantially and consume the entire surplus generated by the team, making
the collaboration ex post inefficient.168
Given its hierarchical and vertically integrated nature, the Chandlerian firm
emerged as the mechanism that resolved the problems of joint production.169 By 
imposing hierarchical authority on team members who are brought within the 
165 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, information costs, and economic organization, 
62 AMER. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
166 Miller, Managerial Dilemmas at 33.
167 Id. at 47.
168 Id. at 49.
169 See, generally, Alchian and Demsetz, supra n.XX.
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organization, the firm eliminated the need for collective decision-making and attenuated 
governance problems: the managers of the firm apportion rewards to the subordinates
(eliminating the need for bargaining and the risk of hold-up), monitor their performance 
and punish shirking, while also rewarding effort.170  Further, the manager sets the goals 
for the firm, and decomposes complex tasks into simpler component tasks, establishing 
rules for the subordinates to follow in day-to-day operations, thereby overcoming the 
limits in knowledge, capacity and rationality of individual team members.171
This benign view of the productive efficiencies of vertical integration informed 
the Chicago New Learning which was an effort to incorporate the insights about the 
efficiency benefits of integration into antitrust doctrine.  By contrast, the classic antitrust 
thinking that found expression in the Warren court antitrust doctrines, was influenced by 
earlier ideas about maintaining the freedom of individual producers, with market 
competition as the only disciplining mechanism. This is why the doctrine was generally 
inhospitable to contractual restraints on the freedom of individual traders,172 as well as 
vertical mergers and other forms of inter-firm collaboration.173
Through integration and planning, the Chandlerian firm was particularly effective 
at achieving production efficiencies in stable market environments where changes in the
patterns of demand, technology and competitive threats were gradual and predictable.  
Even within stable environments however, the task of the managers in the hierarchy was 
not a simple one.  As Miller documents, managerial problems arise due to the inability of 
managers to observe the level and cost of effort of subordinates, making it difficult to 
ensure task compliance either through rules or through incentive schemes that align the 
interests of principals and subordinates.174 Similarly, the Chandlerian firm was plagued 
by bargaining problems, in the form of industrial conflict over the distribution of surplus 
profits.175
Internal pressures within hierarchical organizations were exacerbated by external 
changes to the environment in which such firms were operating.  One external pressure 
was increased volatility of the market environment, due to greater openness of once 
protected domestic markets to international trade and related rapid changes in technology 
and demand patterns.  Such an unstable environment made it even more difficult for 
managers to monitor subordinates, since outcomes were contingent on many external 
170 Id. at 782.
171 Id.
172 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
173 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
174 Miller, Managerial Dilemmas, 144-49.
175 Id. at 35.
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confounding factors, of which the manager cannot be aware in advance. In a turbulent 
environment, firms cannot rely on executing plans as the main tool for decision-making 
and organizing production, placing a premium on the ability of firms to operate flexibly, 
be able to adjust to changes quickly, and innovate constantly.   Therefore, the firm's goals 
could not be limited to reducing the cost of producing and delivering a given product, but 
instead the firm must develop a robust project-selection process, so as not to be left 
behind by developments in the market. 
The firm innovates by selecting and executing new goals, which, as already 
explained does not depend only on the firm's incentives,176 but also its capacity to acquire
knowledge about the world so as to select and evaluate possible future projects.177 Since 
no "single company has the full range of knowledge or expertise necessary for timely and 
cost-efficient product innovation,"178 the firm must search for others already solving a 
similar problem, or at least some component of that problem.  As the ultimate aim is to 
solve problems for which the firm does not already have an answer (or has not even 
identified), the point of such a search is to divert attention from habits and routines within 
the firm, generate information about the advantages and disadvantages of identified 
possibilities, thereby limiting the search process and making it manageable.179
Three disciplines regularly used by firms in selecting and refining future 
production goals include benchmarking, error detection and correction, as well as 
simultaneous design.  Benchmarking identifies the successful solutions by other firms 
who are solving the same or similar problems in order to identify the set of best current,
or potential, designs. Error-detection, on the other hand, focuses on break downs in the 
chains of activity that lead to current disruptions in production or product design.  These 
disciplines can define a space of design solutions that are similar, but in some ways also 
better than, current solutions, while at the same time identifying potential collaborators in 
delivering a new design to the market.  Furthermore, such design-selection techniques are 
176 Economics does not have much to say about the goal-selection process of the firm.  The 
entrepreneur is the least well explained link in the process of production and distribution, reflecting the 
deeply ingrained idea that the entrepreneur is powerfully motivated by the profit incentive to bring forward 
and execute good ideas. 
177 In the standard models examining incentive compatible mechanisms for the subordinates of the 
hierarchical organization, the principal is assumed to lack information about the agents' costs of 
performance for a set project with a given revenue stream.  The problem of eliciting this information is a 
difficult one, and as Holmstrom and others have shown, this problem cannot be solved through budget-
balancing incentive payments to the subordinates.  However, selecting one project among many for the firm 
to pursue is arguably the more difficult problem, and not one that the principal can solve without eliciting 
information about technological capabilities, production constraints and consumer preferences from the 
subordinates. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas at 138.
178 Lam, supra n.XX, at 973.
179 Sabel, Real Time Revolution at 120.
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robust and "can be expected to produce workable answers in turbulent task 
environments."180 By benchmarking, the firm surveys the field of possible design 
solutions, some of which illuminate unforeseen problems and solutions and increase the 
reliability of the ultimate product design.181  To this we might add that benchmarking and 
error-detection could identify design alternatives that the firm decides not to pursue at 
present, although such alternatives might become more suitable in the dramatically 
different market conditions of tomorrow.
The design process is refined through iterated modification of the initial 
specifications and this involves on-going consultation and contributions from 
collaborators, namely the firms that supply either component parts or complementary 
products.  The process is iterated, since rapid shifts and unpredictable changes in the 
market make it imprudent to commit excessively to one design version.  Furthermore, the 
collaborators must be involved in this process jointly, because changes in the 
specifications or requirements that could improve the performance of one aspect of 
product design will require incorporation and adjustments in the design of other 
components.182 As Jorde and Teece point out, this process continues even after a product 
is developed, produced and delivered to market.183 These practices are contingent upon 
the existence of a standard or platform that supplies the language for collaboration, as 
well as avoiding the governance problems, described earlier, that impede decentralized 
team production in the absence of hierarchical authority. 
On one view, a partial solution to the team governance problem is inherent in the 
disciplines of innovation and product design already described.  In particular, the 
"collaborative processes for disciplined joint inquiry about how common projects can be 
improved to mutual benefit,"184 also provide mechanisms that ensure the accountability 
of other collaborators, precisely because they rely on rich mutual provision of 
information.  Such information provision attenuates the opportunities for collaborating 
partners to shirk or to withhold relevant information, about their capabilities or about 
their costs.185
180 Id. at 128.
181 Id.  at 130-31.
182 Sabel, Real Time Revolution at 131.
183 See supra n.XX and accompanying text.
184 Gary Herrigel, Emerging Strategies and Forms of Governance in High-Wage Component
Manufacturing Regions, 11 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 45, 52 (2004).
185 Sabel, Real Time Revolution at 132-133 ("At least some of the information needed for the 
substance of collaborative problem solving in particular cases can be used for benchmarking the abilities 
and probity of current and potential partners.")
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However, the provision of information necessary for joint development attenuates 
some of the governance problems of team production, it exacerbates others.  In particular, 
such information sharing makes collaborators particularly vulnerable, because one firm 
may be tempted to appropriate the fruits of the joint exploration and innovation.  In 
addition, in case of a break-down in the relationship, one firm could inhibit the capacity 
of its collaborators to innovate.  Furthermore, antitrust lawyers have always recognized 
that information sharing among competitors or potential competitors  makes it easier for 
them to coordinate their decisions at the expense of third parties, such as consumers or 
other entrants.
The remainder of this section examines a number of alternative mechanisms that 
could be used for the governance of innovative collaborations, including contracts, 
intellectual property, and incentive compatible mechanisms.  For a number of reasons 
none of the above mechanisms provides an adequate response, leaving open the space for 
antitrust to fulfill this role.  After all, antitrust is a tool for moderating inter-firm 
relationships.  However, as will be seen, the antitrust mechanisms that are effective in 
these contexts do not rely on the traditional antitrust remedies, including ex post awards
of treble damages, or the imposition of unqualified duties to deal with collaborators. The 
prospect of such remedies only escalates threats of opportunistic hold up.  As the antitrust 
disputes described in the prior section illustrate, once a collaboration break-down results 
in litigation, firms can assert overlapping claims of breaches of contractual, intellectual 
property rights, as well as the antitrust laws.  In this context, standard antitrust and 
intellectual property remedies simply exacerbate the incentives for opportunistic conduct.
Relying on the usual armory of debilitating remedies under the intellectual property and 
antitrust regimes enhances the credibility of the threat to walk-out from the negotiations.  
Doing so credibly, enables a party to claim a greater portion of the surplus in any 
settlement negotiations and therefore, provides an ex ante disincentive for collaboration. 
B. Contracts, standards and incentive-compatible mechanisms
(1) Governance through contracting
Contracts among collaborating firms cannot provide an effective solution to the 
governance problems likely to arise.  The modern collaborative relationships involve a 
much deeper level of involvement between the firms than was present under traditional 
arms-length contracting.  The firms are not simply trading widgets used in the production 
process. Through the disciplines for innovation described earlier, they are jointly making
sense of the problem presented and designing a solution.  Furthermore, neither the 
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outcomes of the process of mutual exploration, nor the range of future states of the 
market are either ex ante certain or predictable enough to make future duties or actions of 
the parties susceptible to specification through contractual rules.186 In other words, the 
parties' investments in the collaboration are not contractible. A fter all, a fully specified 
contract to govern such a relationship would be nothing but a plan, and as already shown, 
planning does not supply an adequate paradigm for the nature and purpose of these 
collaborative relationships. 
Nor does it help to characterize such close collaborations as relational contracts, 
as this simply restates the problem, rather than providing a solution. Presciently, Robert 
Scott has observed that "[w]e are all relationists now."187 To characterize a contract as 
relational simply acknowledges the existence of contractibility problems in a relationship, 
making it impossible to specify contractual rules that identify the parties' future duties 
and obligations.  As a consequence, parties will avoid specifying details and instead will 
need to rely on some other mechanism to resolve the contracting problem, though it is not
obvious what that mechanism would be.  For example, purely informal, reputation based 
mechanisms can control opportunistic conduct in small groups with limited and stable 
memberships.  In such settings, the existing mutual bonds of trust and community create 
a credible threat of punishment by the community for non-cooperative opportunistic 
conduct by individuals (for example through exclusion from and ostracism) even in the 
absence of rules.188  Such is not the environment where potential collaborators are 
numerous and diverse, where they may originate in different parts of the world and where 
186 Given such uncertainty, the future duties of the parties would have to be very broad in scope, and 
parties would be unwilling (or unable) to commit to such duties (e.g., a platform owner would not credibly 
commit not to integrate into related markets).  Alternatively, the duties would be so imprecisely defined, 
compliance would be difficult to verify to an enforcing court (e.g., an undertaking by a platform owner to 
continue to provide full interoperability information to downstream collaborators).  
187 Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U.L. REV.  847, 852 
(2000).
188 Lisa Bernstein has written about the use of informal mechanisms (such as reputation) as an 
alternative to formal contract to resolve disputes and solve problems in communities of commodity traders, 
such as diamond or cotton traders.  While she these non-formal systems opt-out of the public contract law 
system (based on the U.C.C.), she recognizes that the practices of such communities cannot provided the 
basis for an affirmative alternative project to the U.C.C.  What sustained the informal mechanisms in the 
past in these communities is the stability of the environment in which the traders operate.  Once cotton 
traders have to deal with others outside of the close-knit Southern communities (in which social and 
economic ties largely overlapped), and the environment was disrupted by removal of protection or new 
technology, the purely informal reputation mechanisms are no longer a viable mechanism for governing 
inter-firm relationships. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:  Creating 
Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Opting 
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
115 (1992).
ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE 47
the industry turn-over is high, or where some firms have a disproportionate power to 
make credible threats compared to others.
The classic relational contract arose in the very different context of long-standing 
relationships among parties locked into mutual collaboration due to their geographic 
proximity, or because their assets and investments are specific to the relationship and 
have no value outside it.  Such a relationship foreclosed outside options for the 
collaborating firms, making it necessary to rely on other mechanisms to resolve disputes 
as they arose. Standard mechanisms for dispute resolution in relational contracts, such as 
the use of formulae to determine mutual prices or "split-the-difference" arbitration are 
unlikely to be suitable in environments where key inputs to production and innovation 
process are not physical, and where the assumptions about the world that are ordinarily 
embodied in such formulae are constantly changing.  Furthermore, in contemporary 
industries, assets are increasingly de-specified, reducing the classic lock- in effects among 
firms. Instead, firms collaborate in order to engage in mutual learning and problem-
solving, which involves extensive sharing of information, leaving them exposed to the 
possibility of opportunistic exploitation only heightened by the fact that assets are not 
specific to the relationship.
(2) Modular relationships
Modular production relationships enable decentralized firms to engage in the 
production of mutually compatible products, while minimizing the amount of intimate 
information firms must supply to other firms in order to mimic market exchange.  
According to one view of modern decentralized production, Langlois suggests that the 
post-Chandlerian landscape is dominated by modularized production approximating 
arms-length relationships where "differentiated exchanges are underpinned by a set of 
market-supporting institutions, notably standard interfaces or design rules."189
Standardization of interfaces ensures inter-firm coordination, allowing firms to innovate 
within their own sphere, but at the same time it reduces the need for firms to share a great 
deal of intimate information.  According to Langlois, firms "arise as islands of non-
modularity in a sea of modularity.”190 In a modular production model, individual firms 
are focused on innovating within their own field (produce their unit) and modules can be 
189 Sabel and Zeitlin, supra n.XX at 388-89, referring to Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in 
Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 19 (2002); Richard N. Langlois, Chandler in 
a Larger Frame: Markets, Transaction Costs, and Organizational Form in History, 5 ENTERPRISE & SOC'Y
355 (2004).
190 Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
19, 34 (2002).
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produced in high volumes and re-combined in novel ways so as to satisfy consumer 
demand.  
However, modular production relationships also rigidify unit boundaries leading 
to the so-called "modularity trap" where the range of possible productive innovations is 
limited by the overall design framework,191 (if we assume the existence of an unchanging 
optimal partition of tasks). Langlois himself recognizes that with rigid boundaries 
between units, modular systems cannot deal adequately with dynamic learning and 
unpredictable novelty.192 Sabel and Zeitlin point out that even in the electronics sector
(often seen as the paradigm), pure modularity is not observed.193  Further, modular 
systems generally underperform in industries where they compete with non -modular 
ones, since firms have to outlay substantial investments to adjust their production to the 
modular architecture, and modular producers are locked into an irreversible commitment 
to a product architecture that may turn out to be unsuccessful.194
Furthermore, the "market-supporting institutions" that develop interfaces and 
design rules for collaboration raise institutional problems of their own. This function is 
ordinarily assigned to trade associations or standard-setting organizations.  In setting 
standards and design rules, such bodies must obtain information from their members, but 
they do not necessarily have the mechanisms to align the individual interests of their 
members either with the interests of the collective or the public interest. The problem of 
joint opportunism of association members who use the standard-setting process as a mask 
for collusion or collusive exclusion of other competitors is well -known to antitrust 
lawyers.195 Moreover, where the standard is used to block entry of competitors, it is 
difficult for an antitrust court to resolve such cases by merely enforcing a set of 
procedural rules and without arbitrating the question of the more appropriate standard or 
design architecture.  
In a similar vein, individual members of a trade or standard association have an 
incentive to subvert the standard-setting process through strategic provision or 
withholding of information, in order to influence the adoption of a (sometimes 
suboptimal) standard that favours the interests of that member. For example, in a number 
191 Henry Chesbrough, Towards a Dynamics of Modularity: A Cyclical Model of Technical Advance, 
in The Business of Systems Integration 174, 181 (Andrea Prencipe, Andrew Davies and Michael Hobday, 
eds. 2004). This seems like a very apt description of the so-called "applications barrier to entry" that the 
court identified in Microsoft.
192 See Sabel and Zeitlin , supra n.XX, at 396.
193 Id. at 395.
194 Id. at 396.
195 Cf. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 497 (standard-setting activity used 
to exclude competitors).
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of recent cases, the antitrust authorities have intervened in order to ensure the fidelity of 
information about patent ownership that a member provides in the proceedings of a 
standard-setting body.196  While trade associations are often governed by rules, such 
associations are not hierarchical and therefore cannot impose a solution. Exclusion from 
the standard-setting process is the only real sanction they can impose for breaches of the 
rules, yet such a threat may not be credible against certain crucial players.
Furthermore, where the modular platform is privately owned, and perhaps 
ubiquitous due to strong network externality effects, the rigid modular design architecture 
presents particular problems from an antitrust perspective.  If the platform owner pursues 
a modular structure, other firms focused on developing their own modules will be 
effective in linking to the incumbent platform, but "will lack the knowledge to envision 
how to connect to a new architecture,"197 thereby limiting possibilities for system level 
learning and disruption of the incumbent's ubiquity.198 In such a scenario, the modularity 
trap resulting from a rigid architecture may actually protect the platform owner's 
monopoly profits.  Not only do individual module producers lack knowledge to disrupt 
the existing architecture, but the platform owner acquires knowledge from collaborating 
with downstream firms and, given the leverage afforded by the ubiquity of the platform, 
can easily integrate into vertically related markets.
(3) Incentive-compatible solutions
In a thoughtful analysis of the foregoing problem, Farrell and Weiser examine the 
platform monopolist's private choice to either maintain a modular market structure or 
integrate into adjacent product markets in order to determine whether this private
decision is consistent with the market architecture that best promotes the public 
interest.199 They argue that from the antitrust policy point of view neither modularity, nor 
vertical integration provides a safe harbor rule applicable across all markets.  In addition, 
the antitrust decision-maker cannot decide that one architecture is unambiguously better 
than the other in a particular market, since in every industry there will be benefits from 
both integration and independence.  However, if the profit-maximizing solution of the 
platform owner is consistent with the social optimum, this would also support a non-
interventionist antitrust policy.
196 See, e.g., Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996); In re Unocal, FTC Docket No. 9305; 
Rambus FTC Docket No. 9302 (all alleging anticompetitive acts and practices to deceive an industry-wide 
standard-setting organization, resulting in adverse effects on competition and consumers).
197 Chesbrough, supra n.XX, at 181.
198 This is precisely an underappreciated aspect of the "applications barrier to entry" that the District 
Court and the D.C. Circuit identified in the government's prosecution against Microsoft. 
199 Farrell and Weiser, supra n.XX at 103-04.
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In Farrell and Weiser's the platform owner chooses between a modular 
architecture or downstream integration. Modularity promotes innovation because of the 
independence that it fosters between business firms: "Modular industry structures enable 
independent firms to introduce innovations into an established environment. An open 
architecture can facilitate innovation in individual components, spur market entry, and 
result in lower prices."200  The platform monopolist also benefits if a modular 
downstream structure fosters innovation in the applications market, because this increases 
the attractiveness and the value of the platform. However, if the platform owner 
integrates into downstream markets, this results in transaction costs efficiencies 
benefiting both the platform monopolist and the pubic. Such efficiencies include
minimizing the risk of downstream holdup, avoiding double marginalization, resolving 
coordination problems among collaborators, ensuring better interoperability between 
products, and enhancing the monopolist's ability to alter platform interfaces in order to 
evolve the platform.201
Invoking a variant of the Chicago school single monopoly profit argument, Farrell 
and Weiser point out that the monopolist has an incentive to promote an efficient market 
structure in the downstream market. Not only does the monopolist not increase its profit 
by leveraging itself into the downstream market (since it could always charge a higher 
price for the platform), but in fact it also gains from an efficient downstream market that 
promotes downstream innovation, which enhances the value of its own platform for 
consumers, and therefore the price it can receive.
However, they go on to caution that this argument does not necessarily support a 
non-interventionist antitrust policy towards a ubiquitous platform monopolist. This is 
because the logic of internalizing complementary efficiencies ("ICE") can break down for 
a number of reasons, which give the platform monopolist inefficient incentives to 
integrate into the downstream market. They identify at least eight reasons for breakdown , 
including cases where the upstream price is regulated, so the monopoly profit can be 
derived from monopolizing the downstream market,202 bargaining failures (between the 
monopolist and a downstream market participant), the monopolist's fear that a 
downstream application could develop into potential competition to the platform, and 
200 Id. at 95.
201 Id. at 97-99.
202 Even if the monopolist is not currently regulated in the upstream market it might wish to charge a 
lower price there and get some of the monopoly profits in downstream markets precisely in order to avoid 
regulation in the upstream market.  
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also, perhaps surprisingly, the incompetence of the incumbent (whereby either the 
incumbent or at least some of its employees do not appreciate203 the logic of ICE).204
By contrast to Farrell and Weiser's model where the monopolist (or the policy-
maker) chooses from two alternatives for the downstream market structure (modularity or 
integration), the model of innovation outlined in this Article is more general.  The 
innovation practices described earlier suggest that for joint problem solving to succeed 
and be robust, the collaborators must be "loosely coupled."205 This implies that 
collaborators must be intimate enough to learn from nuance, but at the same time 
sufficiently detached in order to be able to break with convention and the habits of the 
group.206  Thus, inter-firm relations need sufficient proximity to benefit from 
complementarities and mutual learning, while avoiding integration in ways that come to 
resemble a hierarchy.
Not only may pure modularity be undesirable as a model of inter-firm 
relationships for the reasons identified earlier,207 but such a structure may be impossible 
in the technology markets, particularly where the platform is owned by a private entity . A 
purely modular market structure would approximate arms-length relationships, with 
minimal information exchange between the platform supplier and downstream market 
suppliers. However, given the need for applications at the two levels to be able to 
interoperate, to coordinate the introduction of new products at both levels sequentially 
and to provide feedback in both directions about the robustness of designs (including the 
interfaces) before products can be delivered to market, it seems difficult to even conceive 
of purely modular relationships.
Once we recognize that in order to produce robust product and systems designs, 
firms must engage in deeper forms of collaboration than those implied by pure 
modularity, the factors identified by Farrell and Weiser that undermine the "logic of ICE"
become even more salient.  In particular, the rich sharing of information in order to 
engage in collaborative innovation elevates the risks of opportunism, and heightens the 
possibility of inefficient incentives for integration.  For example, the platform maker 
might learn sufficiently from the relationship to enable it to integrate in the downstream 
market and eliminate the value of the investments of the downstream collaborators, or 
203 We should add that employees might make decisions inconsistent with the logic of ICE either 
because they do not appreciate it, or due to agency problems, where the interests of those particular 
employees are more consistent with vertical integration, instead of proper assessment of ICE.
204 Farrell and Weiser, supra n.XX at 105-19.
205 Karl E. Weick, Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems, 21 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 1, 3 (1976).
206 Sabel, Real Time Revolution, at 116.
207 Supra, section V.B.2.
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conversely, that the downstream collaborators will be able to create products which are a 
substitute for the platform of the monopolist.  The risks of ex post opportunism could also 
lead to bargaining failures.  
Finally, Farrell and Weiser's observation about the "incompetence" of the
incumbent becomes more important and is generalizable.  The incumbent (or its 
management) may in fact realize the logic of ICE, yet they might not know precisely 
what would be the structure of an efficient downstream market , particularly in a dynamic 
underlying environment.  Uncertainties about the future regulatory and competitive 
environment, together with the possibility that downstream suppliers may commoditize 
its platform by learning from the collaboration, are all additional reasons for inefficient 
downstream integration, which create further doubts that the platform monopolist would 
be a good steward of the downstream market through its own unilateral decisions.
C. Property rights in innovation
The courts' growing emphasis on strong intellectual property protection to 
preserve the incentives for innovation by corporations, in preference to ex post antitrust 
duties, is also not an adequate solution to the governance problems in inter-firm 
collaborations identified earlier.  If the contributions of individual firms to a common
innovative venture or design could be clearly delineated and protected by the grant of a 
property right (such as a patent or copyright208), this would have a number of beneficial 
consequences.  First, and most importantly, the delineation of boundaries would attenuate 
the collaborators' concern that one of them could appropriate the fruits of the mutual 
collaboration. Secondly, clear assignment of property rights can lead to efficient 
outcomes from Coasian bargaining and, in fact, if the individual contributions to the joint 
product are clearly identified, this may also reduce the costs of bargaining.  Finally, 
consonant with the traditional understanding of the rationale for intellectual property, the 
right to exclusivity of appropriation provides incentives for each collaborator to invest in 
that component of the collaboration over which it has residual control. 
208 It is unlikely that mere reliance on trade secrets would be sufficient protection in the context of 
innovation collaborations, since the process of mutual sense-making (including practices such as 
benchmarking, error-detection and correction and simultaneous innovation) depend upon the substantial 
sharing of information among collaborators, as the Intel case illustrates.  Thus, a right of exclusivity, such 
as a patent, would be necessary to allow the collaborators to share information, while at the same time 
maintaining their proprietary interests.  By contrast, trade secrets are contractual tools that prevent the 
collaborators from sharing confidential information with other non-parties to the collaboration.
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(1) Practical and conceptual problems
The practical limitations of the intellectual property regime as a solution to the
governance problems in team production stem from the fact that the patent and copyright 
systems emerged against the background of very different processes of discovery and 
creation, which were more suited to stable environments rather than the practices of rapid 
and on-going innovation described earlier in the Article. A key limitation stems from the 
fact that both copyrights and patents rely on judicial action for ex post enforcement.  
Furthermore, the process of granting the property right ex ante for both copyright s and 
patents also presents problems.  A copyright, for instance, subsists in the final 
embodiment of the creation, and no attempt is made to distinguish the contributions of 
different collaborators towards the final product at the point when the right is created.
The grant of a patent depends on hierarchical action — namely, an administrative process 
before the Patents and Trademarks Office assessing the innovative contribution of the 
patent application — which presents a set of institutional questions.
The institutional infirmities of the intellectual property regime, and particularly 
the patenting system, have been the topic of extensive academic and policy scrutiny.209
That criticism focuses on the limits of the patent examination process, including the time 
and resources available to examiners, which makes a detailed and careful assessment of 
the merits of each individual patent application impossible. This is seen as one of the key 
reasons for the dramatic increase in the proliferation of patents in recent years.210 An 
even more important limitation, particularly if intellectual property rights are to provide a 
solution of the governance problem in inter-firm collaborations, is the process by which 
the patent examiner acquires knowledge in order to process the patent application.  Patent 
applications are submitted by an applicant who claims to be the inventor, and the novelty 
and inventiveness of the applicant's contribution are decided in an administrative 
conversation between the patent examiner and the applicant, by reference to the prior art 
and prior use.211  Importantly, other claimants do not take part in this process, and the 
purpose of patent examination is not to identify and allocate the contributions of different 
209 Carl Shapiro, Technology Cross-Licensing Practices: FTC v. Intel (1999), in The Antitrust 
Revolution (John E. Kwoka and Lawrence J. White, eds.) 350, 354 (2004).  
210 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights 
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 588-91 (1999)
211 While a patent can be issued in the name of a number of inventors who jointly developed the 
invention, the patenting process does not allocate rights as between those inventors.  Similarly, where two 
or more applications are submitted claiming the same invention, the process of resolving patent 
interferences is designed to identify who has the better claim to exclusivity.  Such an all or nothing 
approach, together with the preference given to those who file earlier under the patent system, only further 
encourage opportunistic use of the patenting system.  
ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE 54
collaborators to the claimed invention.212  Once a patent issues, it is presumed valid213
and any further disputes about either the validity or infringement of a patent are decided 
in court, where judges are at an even more significant information disadvantage.214
These features of the process, together with the armament of remedies that exist under the 
intellectual property laws, allow firms to use patenting defensively and strategically, 
increasing the cost of bringing novel technology to the market in a world where the 
number of patent grants has grown exponentially.215
The practical limitations of the intellectual property solution to the governance of 
collaborations cannot be overcome by adjustments in the patenting regime because the 
property based solution to the governance problem is also conceptually unsound.  The 
conceptual reasons are similar to those that led to doubt the effectiveness of contract or 
modularity as governance mechanisms. Collaborative relationships, in part, overcome the 
limits of individual rationality and imagination through the mutual "sense-making" in an 
increasingly complex and fast-moving world. To the extent that this process is more akin 
to a conversation or deliberation,216 it is doubtful whether the outcomes of such process 
can be represented in a way that satisfactorily allocates the individual contributions of the 
collaborators.  Any attempt to do so ex ante, or in the course of product design and 
development, will slow both the patenting and the innovation process to a halt. As 
Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel explain, in the deeply collaborative relationships in the 
automotive industry, even the residual control over physical assets is not clearly 
delineated in a way that would resolve the team governance problem to provide an 
effective protection from appropriation.217
212 If the PTO were to be given the mandate to carefully examine the individual contributions to 
particular innovations in a way which at least attempts to draw those boundaries more carefully (including 
by extending rights of participation in the process to third parties), this would slow the process 
substantially, making it irrelevant to firms in highly dynamic markets.
213 35 U.S.C. § 242.
214 The possibility of litigating patent disputes only heightens the opportunistic incentives for using 
the patent regime, because a firm can hope to either persuade a relatively uninformed court to assign the 
entire property right to itself, or can use the threat of the very potent remedies (such as an injunction to shut 
down the business of its collaborator, or winning an award of damages which in patent disputes can be very 
substantial) as a tool to bargain a greater share of its collaborator's surplus.
215 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 
in 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
216 See Charles Taylor, To Follow a Rule…, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS, 165, 172-73 (1995).
217 Susan Helper, John P. MacDuffie, Charles F. Sabel, Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing 
Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism, 9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 443, 482 (2000) ("Joint control of 
the assets in the new collaboration shades into joint residual control, and thus a novel form of ownership.").  
While this might be seen as a novel form of ownership, the more important point for present purposes is 
that delineation of property rights, combined with the right to exclude, does not protect from appropriation.
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(2) The FTC's "romantic" view of patents and pragmatic view of remedies
The F.T.C.'s complaint against Intel illustrates both some of the problems 
identified above and one possible way of mediating the excesses of the antitrust and IP 
regimes.218 The FTC challenged Intel's resort to self-help in the patent disputes with its 
collaborators, arguing that those patent disputes were better decided in court.  Carl 
Shapiro criticizes the FTC's position as being based on a "romantic" view of patents.219
Arguing that litigation was the more appropriate forum in which to resolve the patent 
disputes is particularly difficult to defend, given that patent litigation is notoriously long 
and expensive, and trial judges are ordinarily reluctant to try patent cases that involve
evaluation of copious and complex scientific and technical evidence.220 However, the 
remedy implemented by the consent decree with Intel reflects an understanding of the 
role of collaboration in promoting innovation, the forces that can undermine such 
collaboration, as well as the ways in which traditional patent and antitrust remedies 
heighten the incentives for opportunistic conduct.  
In what was essentially a bargaining dispute within a collaborative relationship,221
the FTC’s consent decree can be viewed as an instrument promoting a negotiated 
solution, which preserves the incentives of the parties to continue their collaboration.  It 
achieved this by eliminating the most debilitating remedies that the parties could rely 
upon if they litigated the dispute, either from the antitrust or intellectual property armory 
of remedies.222 Thus, the complaining firms gave up the right to seek treble damages 
under the antitrust laws.223 Further, the consent decree provided that the complaining 
firms would not seek an injunction which would shut down Intel’s operations as a remedy 
in the patent litigation.  Intel, on the other hand, gave up its right of self-help against the 
complaining firms, namely to stop providing advance technical information, which would
retard their ability to innovate. If firms in the position of the complainants fear that the 
contributions they bring to the relationship and joint innovation could easily be 
appropriated by Intel, this would be a disincentive for such firms to invest in the 
collaboration.224  Similarly, Intel as the platform owner would be reluctant to engage in 
218 See supra, section IV.C.3.
219 Shapiro, supra n. XX at 353.
220 The implication is that ultimately nobody is interested in resolving intellectual property disputes, 
particularly in technologically complex settings. 
221 Farrell and Weiser, supra n.XX at 112-13.
222 This approach was important given that the main obstacle to a negotiated solution is the parties' 
perceptions of their outside options and their (biased) judgments about the probabilities with which such 
alternatives are likely to eventuate.
223 Only Intergraph proceeded with its ultimately unsuccessful antitrust suit against Intel. Intergraph 
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
224 Cf. Pitofsky, supra n. XX at 549-50.
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closer collaboration with other firms, if this results in an ex post duty to continue to 
collaborate even in the face of opportunistic conduct by downstream firms.
By eliminating the most extreme litigation options that would give the parties 
reasons for hold-out,225 the FTC consent decree increased the likelihood that the disputes 
in the collaborative relationship could be resolved.226 Therefore, the possibility of a long 
and protracted patent litigation, in which a court would reach a one-sided and perhaps 
arbitrary decision, could be viewed as the penalty that the parties would have to incur if 
they did not reach a negotiated resolution to their disputes.227
(3) "Dilution" of IP rights
The discussion in this section illustrates the problems with the ascendant view that 
strict protection of intellectual property rights is an essential precondition to provide
incentives for firms to invest in innovative ventures and that the ex post imposition of 
antitrust duties on the successful innovator dilutes those incentives. For instance, Elhauge 
has criticized courts (and scholars) who advocate imposing antitrust duties on a patent 
owner based on a case-by-case assessment of the effect of such duties on the innovation 
incentives in the industry:
[B]oth [Scherer's] theory and evidence are purely ex post.  
They cannot tell us whether, if these firms had realized the 
law would impose this risk of compulsory patent licensing, 
they would have had sufficient ex ante incentives to create 
the initial inventions ...228
In words that resonate with the Trinko decision, Elhauge argues that "the prospect of 
future monopoly profits is necessary to encourage ex ante innovation and investment to 
225 Shapiro correctly recognizes that the underlying problem was an attempt to engage in 
opportunistic hold up by a party to a collaborative relationship.  His is not inconsistent with the FTC's view 
of the problem.  The only difference is that the FTC was of the view that Intel could also have been 
behaving opportunistically, and disapproved of its attempt to foreclose the other firms from making their 
claims by use of the power arising out of its dominance in the microprocessor market.
226 Intel agreed to the consent decree, even though it consistently contested the point that it violated 
the antitrust laws.  Further, at least in respect of Digital and Compaq, it seems that the firms had already 
moved towards a resolution with Intel. See Shapiro, supra n. at 359, 360-61.
227 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Regulation:  Penalty Defaults, Destabilization 
Rights, and New Environmental Governance, in New Governance and Constitutionalism in Europe and the 
U.S. (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds. forthcoming 2006).
228 Elhauge, supra n.XX at 301.
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create that monopoly power."229 And further, even in cases where the patent monopoly 
was created improperly230
Forced sharing of the improperly created monopoly does 
not remedy the past mistakes.  Rather, it worsens them by 
undermining not only the monopolist's incentives to 
maintain and enhance the value of the property that gives it 
monopoly power but also rival incentives to duplicate the 
functional benefits of that property.  And it creates 
enormous administrative difficulties by requiring antitrust 
judges and juries to set the reasonable price for access, a 
task rendered only more difficult by the fact that optimal 
prices will continually vary over time with changing market 
conditions, but will end up being assessed retrospectively 
by antitrust tribunals after years of adversary proceedings, 
with any wrong guess being punished by treble damages.231
However, the evidence that the simultaneous model of joint problem-solving has 
decided advantages in high technology industries suggests caution about viewing rights 
in intellectual property in such absolute terms, as if they have resulted from dedicated 
unilateral research efforts of a single enterprise.  A firm operating in turbulent market 
conditions may neither have capacity nor the incentive to invest in such a research effort.
Yet a manufacturer or software developer cannot afford not to innovate because market 
conditions are constantly changing and failure to keep pace would be disastrous. The 
tendency towards experiential and on-going innovation practices, based on provisional 
designs and iterated solutions, arises precisely because it is risky for the firm to invest too 
much in research which is contingent on a particular future state.  Further, product or 
process developments that are protected as intellectual property can be the result of 
learning and sharing of information that draws from other actors involved in the 
production process.  A firm depends upon the information supplied by users about 
problems they have encountered, or feedback from vertically related firms in order to fix 
problems with their own product, and such information can be used for strategic or 
opportunistic purposes. 
Dominant firms that have a gate-keeping function, particularly in industries with 
strong indirect network effects, benefit significantly from their collaboration with other 
firms. Such collaboration enhances the value of the network, the barriers to entry that 
prevent a challenge to the dominant firm, and the value of intellectual property.  
However, such firms also have a disproportionate power to force a resolution of any 
229 Id. at 298 (original emphasis).
230 Or one could add, provided by the government or through governmental subsidies or protection.
231 Elhauge, supra n.XX at 308.
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emerging dispute in their own favor.  An untrammeled right to refuse to continue to 
cooperate (even in the absence of any ex post effects on consumers in the market or 
product under scrutiny), reduces the ex ante incentives for other firms to participate and 
invest in collaborative efforts or the incentives of venture capitalists to finance such firms 
who would be subject to significant hold-out costs from a termination of the 
collaboration.
D. Antitrust governance
The advancement of innovation in modern markets requires collaborative modes 
of production among decentralized production units, in a way which charts a path 
between purely arms-length or modular relationships (which are either impossible or 
undesirable given the nature of production) and hierarchical relationships (which allow 
for integrative efficiencies and aim to control the opportunism of subordinate units, but 
also stifle inventive learning). While the governance mechanisms discussed above show 
limited promise of success, the classic antitrust remedies are similarly constrained.  The 
solution to the governance problem does not lie in damage payments for the violation of a 
given rule. Indeed, if ex ante rules could adequately resolve the governance problem, the 
parties may have generated those rules themselves. Nor does the solution lie in 
reallocation of property rights, such as a duty to deal, which would not adequately control 
for collaborator opportunism or take into account possibilities of integrative 
efficiencies.232 And yet any more nuanced or substantive remedy would tend towards a 
particularly undesirable form of hierarchical intervention: a legal or administrative 
solution to problems of product design.  
However, some more recently implemented antitrust remedies demonstrate 
sensitivity to the problems identified so far, and develop governance mechanisms for the 
on-going cooperation in the industry. Such mechanisms are not based on rigid rules or 
arbitration, but instead on institutions which might promote learning about the industry,
while resolving disputes among collaborators. The remedies evaluated in the remainder 
of the Article stem from litigation against Microsoft, including the main U.S. litigation by 
the DoJ together with the Attorneys General of 20 states, and the European Commission's 
decision that Microsoft had violated EU competition law. The focus is on the features 
232 As a corollary of those two observations, the hierarchically imposed (i.e., judicial or 
administrative) structural remedies involve the design of the market structure, which cannot be done either 
because of the complexity of the underlying production relationships or the instability of the environment 
in which the firms operate. 
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incorporated in the design of these mechanisms to generate knowledge through 
monitoring inter-firm relationships, but also to ensure accountability of the new 
implementation bodies. 
(1) Schumpeterian Competition or Evolving the Platform
The government's prosecution of Microsoft was based on its practices directed at 
so called "middleware" applications such as the Netscape Browser and the Java Virtual 
Machine.  Microsoft implemented a number of strategies, through its relationships with 
other firms in the industry, in order to prevent the growth of middleware applications.  
Those strategies were motivated by Microsoft's fear that, because middleware 
applications expose their own APIs (and therefore applications can be written for 
middleware), they could replace or commoditize the Windows operating system. 
Microsoft attempted to forestall the growth of middleware applications not only by 
developing its own alternative products, such as the Internet Explorer browser, but also 
integrating them into the Windows platform.  
Further, Microsoft instituted a set of exclusive contracting practices with 
downstream suppliers, such as computer equipment manufacturers, other platform 
suppliers (Apple) as well as software applications suppliers requiring downstream 
suppliers not to support Netscape's browser, as a condition for Microsoft's continued 
cooperation.  Given the overwhelming dominance of Windows in the operating systems 
market, as well as of Microsoft Office in basic software applications, Microsoft could 
impose such conditions.  Microsoft went further and by invoking its intellectual property 
rights, dictated some of the micro details of the way in which the computer equipment 
manufacturers would configure their personal computers, including the appearance of the 
desktop after the initial start up of the system.233
By the time the case reached the D.C. Circuit, the government's claim was based 
on a monopoly maintenance theory under section 2 of the Sherman Act.234 In particular, 
the government claimed that through its practices directed at Netscape and Java, 
Microsoft was aiming to protect its operating system monopoly by extinguishing the 
threat that the middleware applications could undermine or replace the ubiquitous 
Windows operating system.  Modern antitrust analysis requires the likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects to be demonstrated before a finding of liability, which in this case 
required proof both that the targeted middleware applications could pose an alternative to 
233 Amanda Cohen, Note, Surveying the Microsoft Antitrust Universe, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 333, 
340 (2004).
234 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006).
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the operating system and that extinguishing those applications strengthened Microsoft's 
market power.  Yet the record did not demonstrate that either Netscape or Java were 
anywhere near a point where they could expose sufficient APIs for applications to be 
written, let alone up to a stage where they could offer a viable alternative to the Windows 
operating system.235
According to Bresnahan, the underlying theory of the U.S. case against Microsoft 
was based on a Schumpeterian236 view of competition in the market for platform 
software, as opposed to, for instance, a natural monopoly theory. Given the strong 
network effects and increasing returns to scale in the supply of the operating system, 
firms compete to capture the field or the entire market.237  Microsoft's use of its leverage 
to impose a number of contractual restrictions was aimed at forestalling innovation that
would, in turn, extinguish emergent competitors for the field, thereby impeding the 
mechanisms of Schumpeterian competition in their nascence.
However, in light of the model of collaborative innovation outlined earlier in the 
Article, it is possible to engage in a degree of revisionism and provide a somewhat 
different interpretation of that case as well as its progeny.  Microsoft's ability to use its 
leverage to impose contractual restraints on various firms operating in related markets 
impeded the possibilities for collaboration among such firms, even though this 
collaboration would result in successful problem-solving innovations that Microsoft 
might not have been able to develop itself.  Thus, such collaborations enhanced the value 
of Microsoft's platform.  Effectively, Microsoft's conduct was an attempt to impose a 
hierarchical structure on inter-firm relationships in the products related to the operating 
system.  In such a structure Microsoft would be primarily responsible for the selection of 
goals and innovation projects, while other firms were largely delegated the task of 
implementing decisions and engaging in limited innovation, within those spheres left 
open by Microsoft.238
Irrespective of the fact that Microsoft's effort and acumen may have produced its 
leading position as an operating system, this quasi-hierarchical market structure would 
retard innovation because it would impede both independent creativity and disruptive 
innovation.  While this might, over time, have reduced the value of Microsoft's platform 
235 The Court overcame this hurdle by claiming that where the suit is brought by the government, the 
court would not require a strong establishment of causation.
236 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1976) (process of 
creative destruction, where a creative new solution undermines the dominance of the previous one).
237 Bresnahan, supra n.XX.
238 The similarity of this form of inter-firm relationships to a modular market structure is quite 
striking, with the exception that the hierarchical model might in fact be better because it does not face the 
problem of collective action in any effort to evolve the platform and the system as a whole.
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making it more vulnerable to a challenger, such a challenge might occur too far in the 
long run and would be uncertain, given that, if unchecked, Microsoft had the ability to 
scuttle (or appease) potential challengers early on.  Thus, rather that enabling 
Schumpeterian competition, the government's case is more appropriately seen to promote
"evolutionary" competition.  Preventing Microsoft from imposing the contractual 
restraints on collaboration would improve the level of innovation within Microsoft's 
platform, also enabling Microsoft to better realize its own self-interest, rather than relying 
on the uncertain future threat of a Schumpeterian rival as a disciplining mechanism.239
The remedial mechanisms in the Microsoft cases provide further support for this view.  
(2) Microsoft remedies
(a) DoJ negotiated decree
Following the decision of the D.C. Circuit, the DoJ, under a new administration 
and with the agreement of nine of the prosecuting states, decided not to litigate the 
remanded liability questions or to seek a judicial remedial decree from the District Court, 
but instead settled the case through a remedial decree negotiated with Microsoft. The 
negotiated remedial decree has received two principal criticisms.  For some, the decree 
was a result of the unwillingness of the DoJ, under a new administration, to prosecute the 
case to its end. By not seeking a more far ranging remedy (particularly by contrast to the 
structural break up that had been originally requested and ordered by Judge Jackson) the 
DoJ, in effect, gave away its appellate victory.240  For others, the key problem was that 
the negotiated decree did not provide a one-off antitrust remedy.  Instead, the decree 
isolated forms of conduct condemned by the court's decision and imposed restrictions on 
such conduct, together with a mechanism for on-going supervision and monitoring of 
Microsoft's compliance, which, on this view, produced unnecessary costs, burdens and 
uncertainty.  
However, the quasi-regulatory remedy was simply the result of the complexity of 
the problems presented by the case. Given the dynamic nature of the technology, a one-
off injunctive decree (i.e., a list of "don'ts") could not have provided an effective remedy 
as much as a recipe on how to effectively evade the letter of the injunction.241  Further, 
239 The fact that such a rival does not appear to have emerged thus far, and the fact that Microsoft has 
in fact turned many of its antitrust foes into collaborators is further evidence that this would have been a 
good strategy.  See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Antitrust Suit Turns Into A Partnership For Microsoft, N.Y. Times, 
October 15, 2005, (partnership between Microsoft and RealNetworks, one of the antitrust complainants 
both in the U.S. and Europe to develop an open alternative in the digital media market).
240 See, e.g., Fox, supra n.115 at  93-96, 110; Timothy F. Bresnahan, A Remedy That Falls Short of 
Restoring Competition, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, 67.
241 The experience with the original Microsoft consent decree only confirms this view.
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even if it were possible to devise an effective behavioral remedy based on simple 
injunctive rules, such a remedy would not be self-executing and would require some form 
of supervision and monitoring.  Even a structural break-up of the company, which is an 
apparently one-off surgical remedy, would involve the court — or some other entity — in 
on-going resolution of a mire of difficult and intractable problems because it requires 
specification of a host of further micro-level details about the activities, staffing, future 
integration and collaboration among the newly separate entities.   
Instead, the remedial mechanism in the decree was not hierarchical and did not 
involve the Court in daily operations of the company, nor did it place all implementation 
functions with one body.242 The process of monitoring Microsoft's conduct and resolving 
questions and disputes that would emerge in the course of implementation was more 
diffuse, through four principal channels.  These channels are mutually supportive and 
encourage mutual learning for all actors involved, including Microsoft as the regulated 
entity.  
The first, "peer evaluation," channel entrusts the primary supervisory 
responsibility for the implementation with a court appointed technical committee of 
experts243 in software design and programming.244  The primary function of the 
committee is to monitor Microsoft’s compliance with the decree, receive complaints and 
relay those complaints to an internal compliance unit established within Microsoft (the 
"internal self-evaluation" channel).245 Microsoft's internal compliance unit coordinates 
the company's efforts to comply with the decree and educates Microsoft employees about 
the requirements of the decree and the antitrust laws more generally.246  Further, the 
decree left a large degree of autonomy to Microsoft to devise its compliance strategy and 
its response to any complaints forwarded through the technical committee.247
The third channel of implementation (the "reporting channel") is based on a 
process of joint status reporting of both strategies adopted and outcomes achieved.  Joint 
242 This is in stark contrast to the AT&T remedial decree, where the Court was at the center of the 
implementation and adjustment of the remedial decree which ultimately restructured the entire 
telecommunications industry.  The original DoJ action against AT&T that lead to a consent decree 
settlement was in 1949.  United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas (CCH) ¶ 68,246 (D.N.J. Jan. 
24, 1956).  The main case against AT&T was in 1974, and was also settled with a consent decree after 
Judge Greene denied summary judgment for AT&T.  United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 
1982), a decree which governed the telecommunications industry until the enactment of the 
Telecommunications Act in 1996.  
243 Microsoft Decree IV.B.3(c). The Technical Committee are the only group that has access to the 
Windows source code to aid their monitoring of the compliance. §  IV.B.8.c.
244 Microsoft Decree IV.B.2.
245 Microsoft Decree IV.B.8.
246 Microsoft Decree IV.C.
247 Microsoft Decree IV.D.3(c).
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Status Reports are regularly produced by Microsoft and the Department of Justice and 
those reports describe and evaluate Microsoft’s compliance with the remedy decree.  The
reports focus on the extent to which the steps and measures undertaken by Microsoft have 
achieved the goals pursued by the decree, and propose alternative measures where a 
particular problem is seen to persist.248  The final channel (the "reserve (or penalty) 
channel") is vested in the court by Judge Kollar Kottely's decision to reserve the district 
court's jurisdiction to revisit the decree, should it determine that Microsoft's compliance 
is unsatisfactory.249
(b) The non-settling states' proposal
While the District Court approved the decree negotiated by the DoJ, Judge Kollar 
Kottely refused to implement an alternative remedy according to the request of nine 
states, which disagreed with the DoJ approach.  The non-settling states continued with
the litigation and argued that the District Court should impose an alternative remedy in 
line with the D.C. Circuit's findings of liability.  The court held that, as a general 
proposition, the imposition of a two track remedy would be too onerous for Microsoft.  
Further, it specifically rejected all of the proposals for alternative mechanisms proposed 
by the non-settling states and their independent expert witnesses.
The non-settling states were strongly opposed to the technical committee, as 
proposed in the DoJ decree, and asked instead for the court to appoint a special master 
and a special committee of independent directors within Microsoft. While refusing to 
appoint a special master to oversee the implementation, the Court agreed to the states' 
request for a special committee of independent directors on Microsoft's board and an 
internal compliance officer with a more independent status within Microsoft:250
[T]he compliance officer position proposed by [the non-
settling states] is appointed by a committee comprised of at 
least three members of the Microsoft board of directors 
who are neither present, nor former, Microsoft employees.  
The compliance officer in Plaintiffs' proposal is protected 
against abrupt termination by a provision which permits 
removal only by the Chief Executive Officer of Microsoft 
248 See Joint Status Report of January 2004.
249 Judge Kollar-Kottelly declined any limits on the court's jurisdiction to intervene in the matter. 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 200 (D.D.C. 2002).  Not only can the parties apply 
for further orders, but the Court can "sua sponte" issue orders and directions.  Id. at 201.  See also Cohen, 
supra n.XX, at 344.
250 New York v. Microsoft, 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 182-183 (D.D.C. 2002).  The internal compliance 
officer was also to report to the plaintiff states.
ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE 64
with the concurrence of the committee that appointed the 
officer.  The compliance officer reports to the Chief 
Executive Officer and to the committee which appointed 
him or her.
In another significant rebuff to the remedy proposal of the non-settling states, the Court 
also refused to allow third parties to have direct access to the remedy implementation 
mechanism in order to make complaints about Microsoft's conduct and allege violations 
of the remedial decree. 
Although the non-settling states did not persuade the Court to impose a different 
substantive remedy, their intervention served the useful purpose of allowing the Court to 
compare the decree negotiated by the DoJ to a specific alternative proposal.  This made it
necessary for the Court to articulate reasons for rejecting their alternative proposals.  In 
the ordinary course of approving settlement decrees negotiated by the DoJ, a court is 
presented with an already finalized proposed decree which it must assess pursuant to the 
Tunney Act.251 In the Tunney Act, Congress empowered Courts to examine antitrust 
settlement decrees with limited Congressional guidance: before approving and entering 
the decree, the court had to be satisfied that the degree was in the "public interest."252
While this gives the court a potentially broad mandate, review is constrained by limits on 
judicial capacity to perform a searching review, particularly since the judge performing 
such review, is largely dependent on information supplied by the settling parties.  Even 
though the Tunney Act allows third parties to provide comments on the proposed decree, 
such comments can be either insufficient,253 or overwhelming,254 so that the court must 
rely on the DoJ to process and sublime those comments.255  Furthermore, the court is 
ordinarily constrained both in its capacity to appreciate the significance of those 
comments, and its ability to reformulate and propose a concrete alternative to the decree 
under review.  Thus, ordinarily negotiated decrees pursuant to the Tunney Act are 
reviewed under a fairly loose and deferential standard, whereby the decree is approved if 
251 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h).
252 15 U.S.C. § 16(e).
253 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 325 (D.D.C. 1995) (in evaluating initial DoJ 
consent decree with Microsoft judge received only five largely unilluminating submissions).
254 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 200 (D.D.C. 2002) (in the final Microsoft 
settlement the court received over 32,000 public submissions: 10000 in favor of the decree, 12,500 opposed 
and the rest expressing no direct view).
255 See Response of the United States to Public Comments on the Revised Proposed Final Judgment, 
2002 WL 32151978, ¶¶ 4-8.
ANTITRUST GOVERNANCE 65
it was negotiated bona fide (in the absence of improper influences) and is within the 
realm of the public interest.256
(c) The European Commission remedy
The goal of European Commission's remedy in its Microsoft decision was to 
promote Microsoft's collaboration with rival suppliers in related markets, while neither 
preventing Microsoft from integrating forward into those products nor chilling the 
innovation incentives for all industry participants.257 In light of the complaints by work-
group server producers, the Commission mandated Microsoft's continued cooperation 
with firms that produce work-group servers in the following terms:
The natural remedy to Microsoft's abusive refusal to supply 
is an order to supply what has been refused.
...
Microsoft should be ordered to disclose complete and 
accurate specifications for the protocols used by Windows 
work group servers in order to provide file, print and group 
and user administration services to Windows work group 
networks.258
On the surface at least, the Commission's injunction that Microsoft must supply 
all the information necessary for the interoperability of Windows with non-Microsoft 
work group servers seems to be a standard conduct remedy.  However, as the 
Commission recognized in its decision,259 the seemingly simple injunction generates
numerous further questions: about the nature and scope of the information that was to be 
disclosed, about ensuring that such disclosure is timely, as well as setting the terms of 
that disclosure so that they are neither unreasonably burdensome nor discriminatory.260
256 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 56 F.3d 1448, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  See also United States v. 
Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715-16 (D. Mass. 1975) (the Tunney Act is a check on the government's 
good faith in settling the case, although the court does not determine if the settlement is the best that could 
be obtained).
257 See section IV.C.2. 
258 Microsoft EU ¶¶998-999.
259 Microsoft EU ¶¶1000, 1005-1006.
260 The uncertain scope of the duty imposed on Microsoft is confirmed by recent events associated 
with implementing the European decree. The first report from the Microsoft Monitoring Trustee found 
initial disclosures by Microsoft to be so inadequate, that a programmer or team would be "wholly and 
completely unable to proceed on the basis of the documentation."  Microsoft's initial response was that the 
European Commission required more than was set out in the decree, although subsequently offered to  "go 
beyond the 2004 Decision and offer a license to the source code" of the Windows system, a proposal which 
met with mixed reactions from both within the Commission and Microsoft's competitors.  See Microsoft 
Offers to Open Windows Code, But European Commission, Critics Doubtful, 71 Antitrust & Trade Reg. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 1755, at 358 (Feb. 3, 2006).
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The Commission's decision provides no detailed or exhaustive rules that govern such 
questions, identifying instead, in fairly broad terms, the objectives of the remedy.261 In a 
manner similar to the U.S. decrees, the Commission relegated the detail to a monitoring 
mechanism established by the decree, in order to supervise Microsoft's compliance 
conduct:262
The effective monitoring of Microsoft's compliance with 
this Decision will therefore have to be ensured by 
establishing a suitable monitoring regime including a 
monitoring trustee. Microsoft will have to submit a 
proposal to that effect. Guiding principles for Microsoft in 
this respect are outlined in the following.
The primary responsibility of the Monitoring Trustee 
should be to issue opinions, upon application by a third 
party or by the Commission or sua sponte¸ on whether 
Microsoft has, in a specific instance, failed to comply with 
this Decision, or on any issue that may be of interest with 
respect to the effective enforcement of this Decision.263
The monitoring trustee was selected by the Commission from a list of experts provided 
by Microsoft,264 and the remedy mandated that the trustee be given access to Microsoft 
employees, premises and the source code. The decree also permits the trustee to 
occasionally call upon other experts, to assist the trustee with discrete and precisely 
defined tasks.265
(3) Evaluating remedial architectures
Judge Kollar-Kottelly's decision that rejected the non-settling states' proposal, and 
a comparison of the proposals of the DoJ, the non-settling states and the European 
261 Microsoft EU ¶1003 ("The objective of this Decision is to ensure that Microsoft's competitors can 
develop products that interoperate with the Windows domain architecture natively supported in the 
dominant Windows client PC operating system and hence viably compete with Microsoft's work group 
server operating system."); ¶1006 (to promote "the objective of ensuring that competition in the common 
market is not distorted") (quotations omitted). 
262 Note that the notion of "compliance" in this context is quite peculiar, in the sense that the 
Commission's decision did not specify what level of cooperation Microsoft needed to maintain with its 
rivals in this sector (there are no rules specifying the protocols or elements of code that Microsoft must 
make available).  Instead, the obligation on Microsoft is to supply adequate levels of interoperability 
information and the definition of what level of cooperation is adequate is part and parcel of the process of 
implementation rather than being determined ex ante.
263 Microsoft EU ¶¶1044-1045 (footnote omitted).
264 The Commission appointed Professor Neil Barrett (a cybercrime expert) as the monitoring trustee 
on October 5, 2005.  See http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2005/2005083.htm (last visited on February 
27, 2006).
265 Microsoft EU ¶1048. 
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Commission, demonstrate three principal controversies about the institutional 
architecture of these antitrust remedial mechanisms.  First, while all of the remedial 
decrees removed the direct responsibility for on-going monitoring, supervision and 
decision-making from the courts  and agencies, the proposed monitoring arrangements
differed in important respects.  The DoJ decree opted for a more diffuse monitoring 
mechanism, including the technical committee, the internal unit within Microsoft and the 
joint DoJ-Microsoft reporting.  By contrast, both the non-settling states' proposal and the 
European Commission opted for a single monitor (the special master and the monitoring 
trustee) with wide-ranging powers and responsibilities.  The states also relied on an 
internal mechanism implemented through Microsoft's corporate governance structure: an 
independent internal monitor responsible to a special committee of independent directors.  
The second key controversy relates to the rights of access to the remedial mechanisms by 
third parties— namely, entities apart from the agencies responsible for the antitrust 
prosecution.  The non-settling states and the European Commission opted to give third 
parties right of access in addition to the monitor's right to initiate their own 
investigations, while the DoJ decree limited the right of access to the remedial 
mechanism to parties of the litigation only.266 Finally, the key substantive point of 
divergence of the remedial duties was the extent to which the different decrees included 
forward looking provisions, to cover products or technologies that were not central to the 
findings of antitrust violation.  This issue was important in light of the fast changing 
environment in which different technologies can become superceded in short periods of 
time.  
In order to evaluate the above questions of institutional design, it is necessary to 
examine the role these mechanisms play in promoting either the efficacy of the antitrust 
remedial mechanisms in achieving the objectives of the antitrust intervention or the
accountability of the implementing bodies (to ensure that the remedy advances the public 
interest, rather than, for example, being captured by the interests of the regulated entity).
Within a standard hierarchical mechanism, both efficacy and accountability are assured 
through the generation of top-down rules that break down the overarching goal of the 
principal into specific tasks. If well formulated, following such rules ensures both the 
266 According to the District Court opinion, the plaintiff states were themselves responsible to receive 
complaints from third parties, assess those complaints and ultimately to decide whether they merit to be 
brought to the mechanism put in place by the decree. New York v. Microsoft, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
Furthermore, the Court directed the states to form a committee which would coordinate their enforcement 
efforts, so as to eliminate duplication of enforcement activities and ease the burden on both Microsoft and 
the court. Id. at 182. 
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effective pursuit of the desired goal, and the accountability of those responsible for 
implementation.  
In the hierarchical paradigm, a remedial decree can be conceptualized as a 
contract of a principal-agent variety, where a principal (the antitrust authority or court) is 
providing a binding contract to the agent (the regulated entity), which the entity must 
accept.  If the principal is sufficiently well-informed about the world and about the agent, 
she both knows the goals she is trying to pursue through the forcing contract, and (more 
importantly) she can translate those goals into specific rules of conduct for the regulated 
entity.  Further, the all-knowing principal observes the actions of the agent — in which 
case the remedial process becomes a relatively easy task.  The principal can both specify 
rules of conduct and observe the regulated entity's actions in order to determine the 
degree of compliance. I n this scenario the monitoring process serves the relatively limited 
function of checking compliance vis-à-vis clearly specified rules.  
In the context of the antitrust remedial decree, as in many other regulatory 
settings, the decision-maker (particularly the antitrust court, but also the antitrust 
agencies) satisfies virtually none of the conditions to be an all- knowing principal.  The 
decision-makers have a general idea of the goals they wish to pursue - such as advancing 
the public interest, restoring competition or eliminating any distortions to competition, 
advancing innovation, preventing the exploitation of consumers, to name just a few 
possible formulations.  The principals are also substantially less informed about the detail 
of the operations and capabilities of the agent necessary to answer questions , such as
whether separating (or uncommingling) the code so as to provide Windows operating 
system separately from the browser or the media player is feasible, whether the release of 
interoperability information to competitors risks  undermining the security or exclusivity 
of the operating system source code and so on.  Furthermore, the decision-maker cannot 
observe all the actions of the agent to determine compliance, making it difficult both to 
write the contract and to monitor compliance.  The problem is compounded by the fact 
that both the principal and the regulated entity are to some degree imperfectly informed 
about the current state of the world, and have far from perfect foresight about ways in 
which market conditions will change in the future (although, again, the regulator is at an 
informational disadvantage).  
Given those conditions, the monitoring system is more appropriately 
characterized as a learning mechanism.  Even if the principal is fully informed about the 
goals she is trying to pursue, she would still need to know what actions by the agent are 
feasible in pursuit of those goals and to call upon some body with greater local 
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expertise267 to evaluate claims of feasibility or determine the level of implementation.  
The monitoring agent aids the principal precisely by providing greater access to local 
expertise about the activities of the scrutinized entity.    
However, the injection of the monitoring agent, as an additional chain in the 
remedial mechanism, creates another form of agency relationship. Ideally, monitoring 
agents advances the goals of the principal, but the incentives of the principal and the 
monitoring agent are not necessarily aligned. Thus, the institutional design should ensure 
that the monitoring agent is properly accountable. Furthermore, while the monitoring 
agent should have a greater degree of local expertise than the principal, to be able to 
better evaluate and respond to claims and conduct by the regulated entity and others in 
the industry, the monitor still does not have perfect knowledge.  For instance, the monitor 
would still suffer from the limits of bounded rationality and the problems of hidden 
action and asymmetric information vis-à-vis the regulated entity.  Successful monitoring 
mechanism design relaxes these constraints, so that the monitor can also access the local 
knowledge only available to market participants.  The mechanism should provide
incentives for the regulated entity itself to volunteer relevant information.  This helps 
both to monitor the compliance with the current set of rules, but also helps the principal 
learn about the market, adjust the rules, or even the goals of the intervention. With this as 
the background, we return to the three controversies identified earlier. 
(a) Who should monitor?
The design of the monitoring mechanism involves decisions about (i) the make-up 
of the monitoring body (whether it should be composed of one person or a committee);
(ii) the allocation of responsibilities to the monitor (whether the monitoring body can 
initiate investigations, carry out those investigations, obtain external assistance, mediate 
or arbitrate the issues that come before it); and (iii) the nature of the relationship between 
the monitoring body and the regulated entity (whether the monitoring body can make 
binding orders about the resolution of disputes or impose punitive measures).  
The non-settling states proposal, like the European remedy, would entrust
extensive responsibilities in a single special master.  In the states' proposal, the special 
master was given a general obligation to take all actions necessary or proper for "the 
efficient performance of the special master's duties."268 The special master was obliged to 
receive third party complaints, evaluate those complaints, carry out an investigation if 
267 Local expertise refers to expertise or knowledge which is close to the every day operations of the 
regulated entity.
268 New York v. Microsoft, 224 F. Supp 2d 76, 180.
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one is warranted, hear argument based on documentation and propose factual findings 
and an order to the court, or alternatively to act as a mediator.269 All these obligations 
were to be performed by the special master within "stringent time schedules."270
The district court rejected all aspects of the states' proposal for a special master as 
a scheme that "would [not] prove to be workable in practice," since it placed the special 
master in the role of detective, prosecutor and judge (as well as mediator).271  While this 
language to some extent reveals the extent to which judges are steeped in the law 
enforcement paradigm of antitrust, there is clearly a tension in placing both hierarchical 
and problem-solving powers in the same person, which would place limits on the 
relationship between the monitoring body and the regulated entity, as well as the extent to 
which the two will be able to engage in free exchange of relevant information.272 In light 
of the basic limits of human cognition and capacity, the Court criticized the special 
master proposal as a "panacea." No matter how capable and knowledgeable the person in 
the position of special master, there would be limits on her capacity to process all 
relevant information, to appreciate the significance of complaints from industry, to devise 
proposed solutions and to do so in a timely manner.
Quite apart from doubts about the effectiveness of this mechanism in promoting 
the goals of the intervention, placing all monitoring responsibilities in the hands of an all-
powerful master or trustee raises significant accountability concerns.  As already pointed 
out, once the monitoring arrangement is in place, the interests of the principal decision -
maker—court or authority—that grants the mandate and those of the monitoring agent are 
not necessarily aligned. Furthermore, the starting assumption was that, while both the 
269 Id. at 180, 181.
270 Id. at 180.
271 Id. at 181.
272 For example, Microsoft's level of cooperation with the technical committee from the DoJ decree as 
compared with the monitoring trustee in the E.U. is likely explained by the different functions of these 
bodies and their relationship vis-à-vis Microsoft.  The E.U. Monitoring Trustee evaluates Microsoft's 
actions to comply with the decree requirements, and in response to insufficient compliance the Commission 
has threatened additional fines (while both the European Commission and Microsoft are also mindful of the 
court review to which the Commission's decision and remedy are about to be subjected).  In the DoJ 
remedy, the Technical Committee submits technical documentation issues to Microsoft, and the timeliness 
of responses is measured by specifically established Service Level Guidelines.  Until late 2005, the joint 
status reports were showing that Microsoft was meeting the guidelines nearly 100% of the time.  Since 
November 2005, both Microsoft and the Plaintiffs acknowledged that Microsoft had started to fall 
significantly behind, and proposed to the Court that Microsoft file monthly reports on its cooperation with 
prototype projects run by the Technical Committee.  Even where problems arise, Microsoft staff have 
worked with Technical Committee staff in order to develop improvised solutions that would ensure that 
data collection and testing is not delayed.  In their filing from Jan. 23, 2006 the Plaintiff authorities 
comment that "[b]y the time of the next Joint Status Report, we should have a clearer picture of whether the 
improvised solution has worked."  Microsoft: The case that won't quit - Deadlines Slip, "mistakes" are 
made, FTC:Watch No. 668, at 11-12 (Jan. 30, 2006).
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principal and the monitor have imperfect knowledge, the principal has less knowledge.  
This is why the principal relies on the monitoring agent to assist in implementing the 
decree.  Since, in both the non-settling states proposal and in the European remedy, the 
monitor is given a broad mandate, and is not specifically hemmed in by a set of rules, it is 
not clear how such an all powerful trustee is held accountable and by which body.  There 
is no mechanism in these proposals that guarantees that the monitor would not be subject 
to capture, or would not be self-aggrandizing or that she would not pursue her 
professional, rather than the public, interest. 
The only proposal of the non-settling states accepted by the district court was to 
appoint an internal compliance officer within Microsoft by a committee of independent 
directors, who is given considerable autonomy in monitoring activities within the 
company.  The rationale for such a proposal is to inject considerations relevant to 
antitrust compliance into the highest levels of strategic thinking within the corporation.273
However, in light of the growing recognition of the weaknesses of existing forms of 
corporate oversight, there are reasons to doubt that the corporate governance route 
provides an effective response to the monitoring problem.  After all, because directors 
rely almost entirely on information from the agents whom they are supposed to govern 
and monitor, they are victims to the selective and opportunistic presentation of 
information.  This would also be the case for a semi-autonomous compliance inspector 
answerable only to independent directors and existing ostensibly outside the structure of 
the company's regular operations.274
This discussion demonstrates the merit of relying upon a number of separate 
channels for monitoring and implementation adopted in the negotiated decree by the DoJ.  
For instance the peer-evaluation channel, through the technical committee, can, on an on-
going basis, tap into on-the-ground expertise in order to assess the significance of claims 
and disputes that arise between the regulated entity, other firms in the market or the 
antitrust agencies.  The reporting channel (performed jointly by Microsoft and the DoJ) 
provides for public evaluation of the implementation of the decree, which promotes 
learning by all who are involved in the process (including other firms). This creates 
opportunities for adjustment of regulatory and business strategy. For example, Microsoft 
273 Such a proposition seems particularly apposite, given Farrell and Weiser's argument that in some 
instances the platform monopolist acts in ways that are not necessarily consistent with its own medium to 
long term self-interest.  Injecting the antitrust perspective (including promoting collaborative relationships 
and promoting an innovative downstream market structure) at the strategic level may be an occasion to 
disrupt and reflect upon a proposed course of action consistent with such a perspective, revealing effects or 
possibilities previously not considered. 
274 In fairness, to the states and their expert advisers, this was not their only proposal for an 
institutional alternative, but this was the only one the Court was willing to accept.
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and the DoJ have jointly proposed adjustment of some of the strategies pursued where 
they were not achieving the goals of the decree.275 The learning by the principal (the DoJ) 
about the market, through direct engagement with Microsoft in drawing up the joint 
reports, is in itself a n accountability check on the technical committee.  Further, if the 
remedy persistently fails in promoting the desired goals, such engagement gives the DoJ 
a better appreciation for the need of further action and the kinds of action that might be 
feasible. Finally, the possibility for the court's jurisdiction to be re-engaged, possibly with 
more blunt and draconian solutions, provides not only a final instrument in the armory, 
but an important background threat that provides incentives for the regulated entity to 
cooperate and work within the remedial decree mechanism.276
(b) The role of third parties in the remedial process
Expanding rights of participation within the remedy mechanism can improve both 
its efficacy and accountability.  Both the U.S. litigation and the decision of the European 
Commission that led to the above remedies arose from government prosecution efforts 
under the respective antitrust laws of the two jurisdictions.  As such, it was only 
Microsoft and the prosecuting government agencies that were direct parties to the 
disputes.   However, those government efforts were generated and informed by 
complaints from firms who were either subject to the restrictive practices employed by 
Microsoft, or the targets of such practices. In the United States, the government litigation 
ran parallel with a number of private suits against Microsoft by its rivals, such as 
Netscape, Sun Microsystems and others.  
The ability of third parties to have a direct "voice in this process"277 enables the 
monitoring mechanism to tap into the local knowledge of participants in the industry, to 
understand their concerns and to learn about technological capabilities of different 
solutions based on benchmarking with solutions of other firms.  This strengthens the 
monitor's ability to assess the actions, claims and capabilities of Microsoft.  Judge Kollar-
Kottelly acknowledged that "very often such third parties will be most immediately 
aware of Microsoft's conduct."278 If modern antitrust remedies are to resolve governance 
problems in the context of innovative collaborations, it is third party firms that are most 
immediately affected by such conduct. Consistent pressure from third party submissions 
275 An opportunity to be part of the process of generating alternative courses of action, with the need 
to justify those alternatives, improves the quality of the information supplied my Microsoft to the 
implementation process.
276 Cf Karkkainen, supra n. XX.
277 224 F. Supp 2d 76, 181.
278 Id.
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to the monitoring and remedial bodies (whether from software developers, equipment 
manufacturers, final consumers, or academics) also enhances the accountability of the 
monitors.  To the extent that the monitoring agent is primarily reactive to third party 
complaints, such direct participation prevents them from shirking, or getting captured or 
self-aggrandizing.
In light of the potential benefits of broader participation outlined above, the 
District Court's refusal to allow third parties to directly participate in the implementation 
mechanism is puzzling.279 The Court's justification that the plaintiff-states themselves 
should "assess the assertions of such third parties for merit" and bring such complaints to 
the remedial mechanism for resolution is not very satisfactory.280  After all, the fact that 
the government authorities call upon the services of a separate monitoring body, and rely 
on third party complaints, is essentially, an admission of their inability to guide the 
implementation process themselves. This may be due to their ability to assess the merits 
of certain complaints or out of fear that they may be subject to capture or the selective 
presentation of information.  Given the court's insistence that the antitrust authorities 
should act as an additional filter to third party complaints, the limitations of those 
authorities' will constrain the efficacy of the remedial mechanism.
(c) Forward-looking mechanisms
In asking for an alternative substantive remedy, the non-settling states' key 
argument was that the terms of the DoJ decree did not go far enough to guarantee the 
restoration of competitive conditions in the market.  The states had three specific 
concerns.  First, they claimed that the decree narrowly defined the middleware
applications to which it was principally addressed, and did not cover a sufficient range of 
applications that could pose a threat to the Windows operating system monopoly, 
particularly in light of the dynamism of the market and the changes that had already taken 
place since the litigation was commenced. For example, even before the litigation was 
concluded, Microsoft had stopped engaging in many of the restrictive practices impugned 
by the original DoJ complaint.281 Similarly, by the time the remedy was implemented, 
applications such as the Netscape browser were no longer viable competitors.  Second, 
the states argued that the DoJ decree did not provide sufficient levels of disclosure by 
Microsoft of the information necessary for developers to write applications that would 
communicate with the Windows system and effectively compete with Microsoft's own 
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 See William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm Misconduct, 31 CONN. 
L. REV. 1285, 1291 (1999).
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applications (a similar concern was the basis of the European case). Finally, the non-
settling states also argued that limiting the term of the decree to only five years was 
insufficient.
The District Court rejected all of the above suggestions for expanding the scope 
of the decree so as to make it forward looking.  The court's opinion did not analyze the 
substantive reasons offered for an extended scope.  Instead, the court emphasized that the 
remedial mechanism was primarily a compliance mechanism, which meant that its 
provisions had to be limited by the practices identified in the original complaint and 
found to be illegal by the D.C. Circuit. While recognizing that it had the power to 
implement a remedy with much broader scope, the Court viewed an extension of either 
the time or the scope of the decree as illegitimate:282 " This suit, however remarkable, is 
not the vehicle through which Plaintiffs can resolve all existing allegations of 
anticompetitive conduct which have not been proven or for which liability has not been 
ascribed."283 Commenting on the terms of the decree, Judge Kollar-Kottelly went on to 
observe that "the Court has taken great care to provide the parties with a decree which is 
unambiguous in its terms so as to ensure that Microsoft's compliance is readily 
achieved."284
Such a characterization of the remedial mechanism is inadequate for at least three 
reasons.  First, given the scope and the breadth of the Microsoft litigation (with a number 
of iterations through government prosecutions in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere, many 
private suits, and unsuccessful attempts to formulate an acceptable and effective remedy), 
it is very unlikely that an effective final remedy could be in the form of a decree entirely 
free from ambiguity in its terms.  The key reason for the complexity of the litigation was 
the profusion of ambiguity — about the nature of the competitive interactions in the 
market, the ultimate effects of the impugned conduct, as well as the outcomes of any 
remedial efforts implemented.  Given this background, if the final decree was 
"unambiguous in its terms," this could only be either because Microsoft had already 
stopped to engage in the practices covered by the decree, or alternatively because the 
decree was so narrow in its scope that market developments had made it irrelevant.  
Furthermore, it is clear that Microsoft and the DoJ did not view the decree as being 
282 224 F. Supp 2d 76, 192-93, 240.  Massachusetts was the sole state that appealed this judgment to 
the D.C. Circuit, which unanimously affirmed the district court's decision.  See Massachusetts v. Microsoft, 
373 F.3d 1199, 1216, 1222-25 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
283 224 F. Supp 2d 76, 192. 
284 Id. at 181.  Judge Kollar-Kottelly went on to cite from the transcript of testimony by Microsoft 
Chairman Bill Gates that the decree provides "clarity of [Microsoft's] obligations that allows [the company] 
to direct [its] employees ... to steer absolutely clear of ever violating one of these things." Id.
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water-tight, since the joint reporting mechanism provides scope for exploring different 
strategies to advance the goals of the decree.  
Secondly, as a matter of legal principle, there was no reason why the terms of the 
final decree should be tightly hemmed in by the judicial findings of violation.285  After 
all, no criminal sanctions or fines were imposed on Microsoft or Microsoft officers in the 
U.S. litigation.  The court did not award damages, nor was the most drastic of measures, 
the break-up of the company, ultimately considered or adopted.  Had those standard 
antitrust remedies been sought or imposed, the case for limiting the remedy to the 
findings of liability would have been stronger — either because of concerns about 
fairness, or because of the need to tailor and quantify monetary or structural remedies.  In 
fact, the main advantage of the diffuse remedial architecture established in the decree, 
with opportunities for the parties to learn and adjust strategy mid-course, is precisely to 
avoid difficult ex ante line- drawing in circumstances where the future of the market is 
difficult to predict.  If similar questions arose in the future, with similar underlying 
problems about mediating cooperation and competition, there is no reason not to resolve 
those problems within the same mechanism that resulted from the original litigation.  
This seems preferable from the perspective of every party involved, compared to the 
alternative of re-engaging the cumbersome, lengthy and expensive apparatus of another
antitrust litigation.  
Thirdly, as the District Court recognized, the remedial mechanism established by 
the decree was, to a large extent, an alternative forum for dispute resolution between 
Microsoft and firms that operate in markets related to the Windows operating system.286
This view is uncontroversial in light of the inherently collaborative nature of inter-firm 
relationships in this industry and the dangers for collaboration break-down outlined 
earlier.287 However, if the remedial mechanism is to be a forum for resolution of future 
disputes, it is difficult to view it as a classic compliance regime — particularly since in 
these industries, the past is unlikely to repeat itself.  
To make the same points in a different way, Microsoft’s aggressive practices 
directed at Netscape or Java created disincentives for firms to cooperate with Microsoft
and innovate within its network, since Microsoft, as the owner of the platform standard,
could determine the dynamics of competition and innovation in the sector.  The decree 
285 It is worth noting that the initial negotiation for a settlement decree was instigated by the original 
trial judge, Judge Jackson, after he delivered his findings of fact, but before he issued any findings of 
liability.  
286 224 F. Supp 2d 76, 181 (the Court faulting the plaintiff states for not having included a dispute 
resolution provisions in their proposed decree).
287 Microsoft Decree IV.D.1.
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provided a framework for the re-building of collaborative relationships in the industry 
which would benefit innovation.288 In this context collaboration does not mean simply 
working together, which is essential in order for related products and services to 
interoperate, but also engaging in the deep sharing of information necessary to produce 
novel and robust solutions.289 The decree mechanism could give smaller innovators a 
venue in which they can air their grievances to the extent that they believe that Microsoft 
has appropriated the value of their joint collaborative investigation, or that its actions are 
likely to harm the public interest in some other way. Such complaints are not guaranteed 
to have merit, nor will they necessarily be heard. However, this process provides 
opportunities for a more deliberate evaluation, even of their own interests, by Microsoft 
and other firms in the industry. For the decree to perform this role, unlike ordinary 
antitrust litigation, it does not create opportunistic incentives for disgruntled competitors 
to sue for treble damages in hoping to exploit the sentiments of an uninformed jury or 
judge or, alternatively to use such a threat as a tool to achieve a favorable settlement.
On this view, the antitrust decree could result in a forward looking governance 
mechanism that would form the basis for an alternative regime of self-regulation of inter-
firm relationships in the industry.  Not only is the availability of such a process beneficial 
to all participants in the industry — including, we should emphasize, Microsoft as the 
network owner — but the technical committee and the joint reporting process also 
generate information and knowledge about the technology and inter-firm relationships 
that can be used in either adjusting the decree290 or in a subsequent more ambitious 
regulatory effort if this proves necessary. 
E. Why antitrust?
It comes as no surprise that, as the structure of markets and inter-firm 
relationships changes, so will the role of antitrust law.  Thus, given the tendency towards 
288 The dispute resolution mechanism utilizing the technical committee and the internal compliance 
unit is particularly important in this context.  Microsoft Decree IV.D.1, 2 and 3.
289 The dispute resolution mechanism utilizing the technical committee and the internal compliance 
unit is particularly important in this context.  Microsoft Decree IV.D.1, 2 and 3.
290 In a joint status report in January of last year, the parties noted that the licensing arrangements that 
were put in place to ensure interconnectivity of servers with the Windows operating system were not 
attractive to potential licensees and did not spur the growth of possible alternative platforms.  See Joint 
Status Report on Microsoft’s Compliance With the Final Judgment, January 16, 2004.  Note that this is 
precisely the issue that the European Commission was concerned with, although unlike in Europe, in the 
U.S. this part of the remedy was justified by the affirmative predatory acts that Microsoft was found to 
have committed. See Massachusetts v. Microsoft, 373 F.3d 1199, 1216, 1222-25 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(Ginsburg, C.J.).   
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networked forms of production among collaborating firms, the antitrust concern shifts 
away from static efficiency towards the governance issues presented by innovative 
collaborations, particularly because the other possible governance mechanisms cannot 
fulfill that role. Yet this Article does not suggest that antitrust mechanisms are likely to 
proliferate as an aid to inter-firm collaboration more broadly.  Such a claim would be 
both conceptually unappealing and practically unattainable in a market economy.  In the 
majority of cases, antitrust intervention is not likely to be necessary.  Inter-firm 
collaborative problem-solving is already prevalent as a mode of production and 
innovation, and in most cases firms find ways to manage their cooperation effectively.  
Those are cases where the intense mutual provision of information about designs and
capabilities, the uncertainty about the future environment and the potential gains from the 
mutual exploration are a sufficient check on opportunistic conduct.291
Within the modes of production of the new economy, competition continues to 
play a key moderating and disciplining function — as a spur for innovation, as an 
incentive to find good collaborators and as a control on collaborator opportunism. For 
instance, firms rely on benchmarking to identify the space of possibilities and to verify 
the claims of the firm's collaborators, but this discipline depends on the availability of 
solutions developed by other firms, not only those who are immediate competitors, but 
also those facing similar design or production problems in other markets. Moreover, the 
tendency towards flexible modes of production leads to an increased de-specification of 
assets which reduces the opportunities for hold-up by collaborators:
[T]he master resource in the new system is the ability to re-
deploy resources fluidly. ... [T]he novel search routines and 
problem solving disciplines help develop this flexibility by 
breaking apart static procedures. Equally important is the 
capacity to re-use a high ... percentage of capital equipment 
committed to one project in subsequent ones ... The greater 
a work team's command of the search routines, the problem 
solving disciplines and the re-configuring of flexible 
equipment, the more accomplished it becomes at re-
deploying any resource.  The effect is that product-specific 
resources are 'de-specified,' coming increasingly to 
291 Alternative institutional forms for managing collaboration have emerged, including consortia in 
which producers help sub-contractors to develop capacities for problem-solving collaboration.  See Josh 
Whitford and Jonathan Zeitlin, Governing Decentralized Production: Institutions, Public Policy, and the 
Prospects for Inter-Firm Collaboration in the US, 11 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 11 (2004).
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resemble general purpose assets, and thus no longer the 
instruments or object of hold-up.292
Despite the fact that certain mechanisms for controlling opportunism are inherent 
in the modes of production, as this Article demonstrates, there remain situations in which 
cooperation break-down (particularly in distributing the fruits of the joint collaboration) 
can occur, and where the possibility of such break-down can act as an ex ante 
disincentive to cooperate.  Furthermore, none of the usual ex ante mechanisms, such as 
contracts or property rights, provides a promising instrument for resolving or attenuating 
the governance problem.  Once disputes arise, the parties do invoke the antitrust laws as 
an instrument for dispute resolution. A possible response of the antitrust authorities is to 
treat this problem as being outside the antitrust purview, even though it affects the 
competitive dynamics in the market, the rate of innovation and consumer welfare.
Alternatively, if the antitrust institutions decide to intervene, any intervention — even a 
seemingly simple duty to provide sufficient interoperability information — requires a 
mechanism to oversee the implementation, and even more importantly to determine the 
content of the duty (what is "sufficient interoperability information").  The threat of 
damages is a clumsy deterrence mechanism, since both sides can have legitimate (or non-
opportunistic) reasons for ending the collaboration.  Therefore, the danger of an award of 
damages ex post only deters, rather than promoting collaboration.
Many of the antitrust cases discussed in the Article arise in contexts where for a 
given reason, such as strong network effects, increasing returns to scale, or in a quasi-
regulated setting, a firm has an overwhelming share of the market in a product which 
becomes a platform to which other firms must adjust their own products. For that reason 
alone, some degree of cooperation becomes inevitable in those settings.  The control over 
the platform product gives the firm the power to act opportunistically in negotiations with 
its collaborators, including a disproportionate ability to appropriate the results of the joint 
exploration (either directly or through integrating vertically) and to inhibit the innovation
efforts of its rivals.  Somewhat surprisingly, the dominant firm may do so even in 
situations where integration would not serve its own interest, properly defined.    
Therefore, the availability of ex post antitrust governance mechanisms can provide a 
credible instrument to "ty[e] the king's hands"293 - enabling a dominant firm to garner the 
diversity of collaborators in problem-solving innovation in a way that helps it advance its 
own self-interest.  
292 Helper, MacDuffie, Sabel, supra n.XX at 472.
293 Miller, Managerial Dilemmas at 155-56 (borrowing the phrase from Hilton L. Root, Tying the 
king's hands: Royal fiscal policy during the Old Regime, 1 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 240 (1989)).
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The remedial solutions that have emerged are more closely tailored to the 
problems that beset these relationships.  In accordance with the modern principles of 
organizational success, the antitrust governance mechanisms are not hierarchical - they 
aim to generate knowledge and encourage cooperation by preventing unthinking and 
opportunistic reliance on self-help strategies.294 Precisely for this reason, these 
mechanisms are preferable to the many alternative proposals for new administrative or 
legislative tools to cope with the antitrust challenges presented by the transformation in 
the nature of productive relationships in the new economy.  
The enactment of the National Cooperative Research Act ("NCRA") was the first, 
although very partial, legislative measure that attempted to deal with the disjuncture 
between the classic concerns and remedies of antitrust law and the need for and the 
profusion of deeply intimate collaborations among modern firms.295 The key reform 
introduced by this Act was to reaffirm that collaborative research ventures were not per 
se illegal under the antitrust laws, and instead scrutinized under the rule of reason.296  In a 
number of contributions, Jorde and Teece criticized the NCRA reforms as insufficient for 
two reasons.297  First, in their view the uncertainty of the content and applicatio n of the 
rule of reason was a continuing disincentive for collaborative innovation.  Secondly, they 
argued that the NCRA was drafted on the erroneous premise that innovation was a serial 
process which began with research and ended with production, instead of the on-going 
iterative and recursive process described earlier in this Article.  Jorde and Teece proposed 
that the safe harbors in the NCRA be extended not only to joint research, but to all 
collaborations involving innovative joint production, commercialization and distribution.  
Further, in order to ensure that such joint arrangements were not used as a cover for 
collusive behavior, Jorde and Teece proposed transferring responsibility for antitrust 
review from the courts to the agencies. Namely, the parties of a proposed collaborative 
venture could notify the venture to the antitrust agencies, and the agencies would vet the 
proposal and provide antitrust clearance for those ventures that do not raise 
anticompetitive concerns.298
294 Cf. Sabel, Real Time Revolution at 108-09.
295 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306.  The NCRA was amended in 1993 and renamed to the National 
Cooperative Research and Production Act. 
296 15 U.S.C. § 4302.
297 See generally Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation, and Antitrust:  
Balancing Competition and Cooperation, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 62 -80 (1989); Jorde and Teece, supra n.XX, 
at 71-81.
298 Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece, National Cooperative Research and Commercialization 
Act: Legislative Proposal by Professors Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece, in Antitrust, Innovation and 
Competitiveness 71, 71-72 (Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece eds., 1992).
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While the above proposals have been partially implemented,299 they are 
insufficiently sensitive to the limitations of a system of notification and clearance both 
generally, but especially in highly dynamic contexts.  Such a regime places an enormous 
administrative burden on the agency to make an ex ante judgment about the likely
competitive effects of collaborative ventures based on a voluminous record of documents, 
before the venture has even commenced its activities.  The Jorde and Teece proposal did 
not provide any mechanisms through which the agencies would overcome the limits in 
their own capacity, in order to gain knowledge about the relevant market.300
In a world in which collaborative inter-firm relationships are widespread, a 
regime for administrative notification and clearance must be either perfunctory or entirely 
meaningless.  The purpose of the new collaborations is not to implement a particular joint 
plan, but instead to jointly learn about the world which is dynamic and unpredictable.  In 
light of that purpose, the antitrust agencies are simply not capable of making ex ante 
predictions about the competitive significance of an arrangement without actually 
monitoring its implementation.  Apart from the fact that such a regime does not 
effectively guard against possible collusive arrangements, the clearance procedure only 
protects the collaborating parties from opportunistic use of the antitrust laws by 
competitors (or consumer plaintiffs) outside the venture.  However, as described earlier in 
this Article, the disputes leading to innovation bottlenecks can arise due to opportunistic 
conduct within collaborative relationships and out of attempts to exploit other 
collaborators.  This is a problem for which the clearance regime offers no solution.
Furthermore, the technological complexity of new economy markets creates novel 
opportunities for collusive arrangements, while making it increasingly difficult for the 
antitrust authorities to appreciate and detect them,301 unless they have ways of monitoring 
and learning about new technologies and market relationships.
299 In particular, § 4301(a)(6) extended the application of the Act beyond research and development 
activities to ventures engaged in the production of the product, process or service (although not 
commercialization, marketing and distribution as Jorde and Teece had suggested).  Also, § 4305 permits 
the joint venture to be notified to either the DoJ or the FTC.  While the agencies do not provide any ex ante 
clearance for the venture, the notified activities of the venture cannot be the basis for a treble damages suit 
under the federal or state antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 4303.
300 Jorde and Teece viewed the European Union as a paradigmatic example of a competition law 
regime that adopts the notification and clearance system, as a way of promoting collaboration and 
innovation.  Jorde and Teece, supra n.XX, at 77. However, since 2004 the European Union has abandoned 
the system of notifying inter-firm arrangements to the European Commission for clearance precisely 
because of the administrative burden on the Competition Directorate, diverting it from other activities, and 
the fact that this provided only a limited opportunity for a meaningful review of the notified arrangements.  
See Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L1) 1. 
301 Avery W. Katz, Contract Law in the Age of the Internet: An Economic Analysis, in ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLE IN CIVIL LAW (Hans-Bernd Schafer & Claus Ott. 
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New legislation is also unlikely to address these governance problems adequately 
and timely.  For example, some have argued that in preference to ad hoc dilution of 
intellectual property rights by antitrust courts, legislatures are better situated to 
implement detailed statutory access regimes that regulate the conduct of the owner of a 
bottleneck in production and innovation, should they deem that the public interest is 
sufficiently engaged.302 However, for a statutory regime to be enacted, the particular 
problem must be sufficiently salient to attract legislative attention.  The legislative 
machinery operates slowly and the point at which legislative intervention is needed is not 
always apparent.  Even for problems which are sufficiently salient,303 legislative solutions 
are by definition ex cathedra and difficult to alter.  In a dynamic market environment, 
detailed and specific statutory schemes would tend to be too rigid and become obsolete 
relatively quickly.  Yet a broadly worded statute would need to rely on the courts or some 
other mechanism for interpretation and implementation.304
The antitrust remedies described earlier are preferable to comprehensive 
legislative solutions for at least two reasons.  The flexible remedy implemented through 
an antitrust intervention, which leaves a high degree of autonomy on the regulated 
entities and provides mechanisms for on-going adaptation, can be a first step towards 
identifying both the extent of the problem and the range of possible and appropriate 
responses.  If developments in the industry or technology circumvent the bottleneck 
problem, the antitrust remedy can be easily terminated.  Further, if the problem persists, 
the antitrust remedy is a mechanism for resolving disputes and generating information 
that builds capacity to develop a more fully fledged regulatory effort by Congress, should 
that become necessary.  
VI. Conclusion
Tubingen eds., 2004) (with the expansion of electronic commerce, sellers may pursue market division 
strategies by restricting the ability of consumers to deal across incompatible networks).
302 Elhauge, supra n.XX at 303.
303 Presumably, the Microsoft problem would be such a case, given the widespread use of the relevant 
products, however beyond that the determination becomes far more uncertain.
304 For those reasons, no legislative schemes have been adopted to deal with the limitations of the 
antitrust regime described in this paper.  The antitrust laws have rarely been amended in more than a 
century to either elaborate more specific rules that govern conduct, or to deal with the profound changes in 
productive relationships that have occurred since their original enactment.  In addition, even where 
statutory schemes of access to infrastructure have been adopted, such as the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 et seq, it was based on the accumulated experience from the courts mandating access 
to competitors in the aftermath of the antitrust break-up of the AT&T monopoly.   
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In a recent article comparing the evolution of U.S. and European antitrust law, 
John Vickers has argued that antitrust can develop into either a form based or an 
economics based law. He proceeds to endorse the latter as a sounder basis for future 
evolution and elaboration of European competition law.305  In his view, form based 
antitrust law aims to develop rules that describe the kinds of conduct that business firms 
should avoid.306  By contrast, economics based evolution would allow the law to distill
underlying principles with reference to actual or potential economic effects.  According 
to Vickers, economics based evolution is preferred because this approach aligns 
competition law with its economic purposes and contributes towards making the law 
internally consistent.  
Yet Vickers’ distinction between form and economics based law may not be as 
simple nor withstand further scrutiny, unless it is linked to a further claim about 
institutional responsibilities for decision-making and mechanisms for knowledge 
acquisition.  If economic analysis could supply ex ante efficiency-based rules to isolate 
conduct likely to be harmful, then this would be nothing but a description of the types of 
conduct that firms must avoid, eliminating any difference between form and economics-
based evolution.307  If the distinction is to hold, therefore, Vickers must be envisaging 
largely ex post analysis of the actual or potential effects of impugned business conduct, 
presumably through extensive involvement of economic experts.  
However, in the U.S. at least, the courts did not whole-heartedly embrace such a 
project.  While the Chicago era focus on efficiency may have been appropriate for the 
Chandlerian production landscape, the courts are not institutionally well-suited either to 
promote efficiency or to arbitrate expert disputes. Instead, they have invoked formalist 
legal screens to limit ex post admission of factual and expert evidence in antitrust 
disputes, even if the doctrinally supple rule of reason allowed (or encouraged) it.308  On 
the one hand, the generation of economic knowledge occurs in one space, often in a 
conflicting and evolutionary manner.  On the other hand, this knowledge was translated 
into economic precedents that satisfy the requirements and limitations of the judiciary.  
Such precedent, once encrusted, discourages the questioning of even erroneous 
principles, or presumptions arising out of ideological habits.  
305 John Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 ECONOMIC J. F244, F259-F260 (2005).
306 Id. at F260.
307 This is unless, of course, "form based law" also incorporates values apart from economic 
efficiency, but that is a very different argument. 
308 The fear of the courts was, in part, due to the fact that ex post adoption of knowledge which is 
highly context dependent would not lead to a coherent set of doctrinal rules.  Lopatka and Page, supra n.XX 
at 695; Harry First, Is Antitrust 'Law'?, 10 Antitrust 9 (1995).
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More importantly, as firms and markets have changed, the static allocative 
efficiency paradigm is less relevant to the new antitrust regime.  Post-Chandlerian market 
relationships are characterized by vertically disaggregated, federated and networked 
firms.  Underlying market conditions change rapidly, so innovation is an essential aspect 
of success and often takes the form of routine problem-solving and re-application of 
existing knowledge to novel contexts.  Collaboration is endemic, as a way of disrupting 
organizational routine and generating otherwise inaccessible information necessary to 
formulate, evaluate and adjust novel designs.  In this environment, collaboration with 
customers, vertically related firms, but also current or former horizontal competitors is 
not merely an aspiration, but an empirical fact.  Such changes in the nature of the firm 
lead to novel problems of managing joint co-development and complex strategic 
interactions in a dynamic world. 
Therefore, contemporary antitrust interventions focus on regulating the forms of 
inter-firm cooperation indispensable to innovation, a problem which antitrust law 
traditionally disclaimed309 and yet one that cannot be resolved through alternative 
governance mechanisms such as contract or property.  Since it cannot rely on the 
traditional deterrence model, the new antitrust policy is more ambitious, and must 
overcome the limits of the standard decision-making mechanisms.  Thus, this Article 
considers a third alternative, of an institutions-based elaboration of antitrust law,310 which 
Vickers’ apparently exhaustive covering of the field does not contemplate. The new 
competition policy is based on designing remedies that resolve concrete problems in 
inter-firm relationships.  Such an antitrust policy is more attuned to the nature of 
relationships and interaction among firms – it is neither inherently suspicious of firm 
action and inter-firm collaboration, nor rooted in the belief that the market is 
presumptively efficient and self-correcting. As a result, in its new phase antitrust is less 
abstemious and self-abnegating compared to its recent past, yet it is not the activist 
enforcer of democratic values of an earlier era.  The inspiration for these proposals, as is 
often the case, comes from actual practice – the emergence of non-hierarchical remedial 
decrees that generate knowledge in order to adjust to a dynamic environment, in which 
the courts merely support an emergent regulatory regime. The Article identifies criteria 
for evaluating those mechanisms in order to understand when and how they may be 
useful and to stimulate further thinking about improving their design.
309 Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1986); 
Trinko. Cf Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
310 Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875 
(2003).
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